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Admission to the Bar Following Conviction
For Refusal of Induction
Part One: Constitutional Issues
No single institution has had a greater impact on the lives of the
present younger generation than the Selective Service System during
the Vietnam War. Because of the widespread opposition among the
young to that conflict, the usual unquestioning, if grudging, accep-
tance of the military obligation has turned into doubt and even
disavowal of the duty itself and a special aversion for performing it
during the war. The desire to avoid service has led to studies, occupa-
tions, and even psychiatric treatments which were neither planned
nor desired.' When actually faced with induction, a number have
chosen to leave the country, while others have decided to enter the ser-
vice and seek an assignment compatible with their reservations. Some,
however, because of their conscientious objections to the military ob-
ligation, war in general, unjust wars, or solely this war, have felt com-
pelled to refuse induction and face criminal prosecution for their act.
A conviction for the felony of draft refusal may have many adverse
long-term consequences, such as loss of citizenship rights2 and dimin-
ished private and public employment opportunities. Chief among
those effects may be disqualification for those occupations which re-
quire state licensing.3 This Note will consider the relation of such
a conviction to qualification for the legal profession. The problem,
stated in legal terms, is whether a conviction for refusal of induction
1. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (authorizing student
and occupational deferments); § 454(a) (requiring mental fitness for induction) (1968).
Selective Service Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25-1622.26 (student deferments); § 1622.20-
1622.23 (occupational deferments); § 1628.1-1628.25 (regarding physical examinations)
(1969).
2. 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 616-29 (1965); 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections § 94 (1966).
3. Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses That Justify Disbarment,
24 CALIF. L. Rav. 9 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Bradway]; Graves, Professional and
Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 334 (1939); Monaghan, The Constitution and
Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L. Rv. 157 (1961); Note, Disbarment:
Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 189
(1958); Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 533 (1962); Note, Disciplining the Attorney for Extra.
Professional Misconduct, 12 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 487 (1961).
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can serve as the basis for a finding that an applicant fails to meet the
character requirement for admission to the bar.4 The basic contention
of Part One of this Note is that in light of the constitutional limita-
tions on such a requirement, a conviction for conscientious draft re-
fusal5 cannot be evidence of unfitness to practice law, and that an
applicant whose record is satisfactory except for such a conviction
should be admitted to the bar.
I. Structure and Procedure of the Admission Process"
Although every state makes some statutory provision for administra-
tion of the admission process, it is universally held that admission to
the bar is a judicial and not a legislative function.7 The highest court
in the state is always at the head of the admission structure. Because
4. To facilitate analysis of this issue, certain clarifying assumptions are necessarv.
First it is postulated that aside from the conviction, the applicant has a satisfactory
record which he will have no difficulty verifying. Second, it is posited that the applicant
will not seek to conceal his conviction or refuse to respond to inquiries regarding it.
This assumption eliminates the problem of obstruction of the investigatory process dealt
with in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), and In re Anastaplo, 365 U.S. 82
(1961). The third supposition is that the applicant has had no controversial political
associations which would raise the problem of disloyalty or lack of patriotism. The last
assumption is that the state court will not construe the oath to support dte Constitution.
usually required of new lawyers, as requiring a willingness to bear anns, and thus pre-
lude conscientious objectors from taking the oath. Illinois was held competent to do
this in In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), a case whose continued %alidity is however
in serious doubt in the light of Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Although
these assumptions, particularly the one regarding political affiliations. may be attacked
as naive, they are necessary to permit a direct, uncluttered consideration of the complex
issue involved.
5. For the purposes of the arguments presented herein, it is irrelcant whedter the
conscientious objection is against all wars or only one war, is based on religious or on
moral grounds, or precludes all or only some participation in the armed forces. Of
course, the typical case today will involve a person whose objection is either !elcctive
or based on ethical grounds and who therefore does not fit within te statutory defini-
tion. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1963). After failing
to obtain the exemption, he feels compelled to refuse induction. But the arguments are
essentially the same if the person receives non-combatant conscientious objector status,
but feels he cannot participate in the army at all, or receihes a total exemption but
feels he cannot even perform the required alternative civilian service. However, in such
cases, and especially the latter type, bar committees and courts are likely to be more
unsympathetic to the arguments suggested herein because the applicant receied recog-
nition of his belief and still refused to perform any service. See In re Brooks, 57 Wash.
2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960). On the other hand, it is possible that the arguments presented
as to the conscientious motive for the crime will be better received where the existence
and sincerity of the beliefs have been officially certified by tie Selective Service System.
The above variations are, however, irrelevant for the purposes of this Note, and the
only assumption made is that some sincere conscientious objection motivates the draft
refusal. None of this is meant to suggest, of course, that there are no persons who refuse
the draft because of fear, selfishness, or a desire to impress a peer group.
6. The information for this general description of structure anid procedure was
derived from examination of the statutes and rules in all the American jurisdictions.
Citations are given only when the information was taken from other sources.
7. Annot., 144 A.L.R. 150, 176 (1943); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 5a. Ga (1937).
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of that position, it is usually authorized to prescribe the rules for the
admission process and at times even to create the necessary adminis-
trative units. In addition, it is always the forum of last resort for an
admission applicant.
The most important body after the state supreme court is the Board
of Law Examiners, Board of Governors or Board of Commissioners, as
it is variously called. This body is responsible for administering the
admissions system and making recommendations to the admitting court
regarding applications. To carry out its functions, the Board, among
other things, will establish a Committee on Character Fitness, as it is
usually called, composed ordinarily of unpaid volunteer lawyers.8 They
are charged with the duty of determining whether applicants to the bar
meet the character requirement. That qualification is usually expressed
as either "good moral character" or "moral fitness" and is normally
prescribed by the statute, although sometimes formulated by the court.
Specific criteria of fitness are rarely given, even in the often detailed
rules of the courts and Boards, and it is therefore unusual to find men-
tion of the relevance of a felony conviction.
The character investigation commences with the applicant's com-
pletion of a questionnaire. 9 Typically, there is a question asking
whether the applicant has ever been arrested, indicted or convicted of
any crimes other than traffic violations and if so, the nature and cir-
cumstances of such offenses.' 0 The application will also usually request
several character references, one or more of whom must be attorneys
practicing in the jurisdiction. The applicant may submit as many ad-
ditional supporting statements as he wishes. 11
Following receipt of the application, the character committee will
begin its investigation. It may consult character references, contact
associates and employers, and independently verify statements in the
application. It may interview the applicant or hold a hearing to ques-
8. Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 FORD. L. REV. 305,
316 (1951).
9. In some states, certification of good character is a requisite for taking the bar
examination, while in others the character issue is only consilered after successful com-
pletion of the exam. Id. at 305-08. This difference has no effect on the procedure used
or the standard applied in judging character.
10. See, e.g., THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 73 (1968) (National Conference of liar
Examiners questionnaire for attorneys seeking admission in another state, question 17.b).
11. In close cases, a large number is not unusual. In Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers, 353 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1957), the Court notes that the applicant submitted state-
ments by all but one member of his law school graduating class and by all his available
law professors. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 264 (1957), mention is made of
the applicant's submission of 42 written statements. Such an exhaustive set of recom.
mendations may be most helpful if an adverse inference ig drawn from the draft con-
viction. Pp. 1379-80 infra.
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tion him on any point relevant to its investigation. 2 It has been held
that if the committee intends to deny admission for unfitness, proce-
dural due process requires that the applicant be informed of the reasons
and afforded a formal hearing to reply to the allegations."3 Since every
state places the burden of proof as to character on the applicant," it
would seem logical that due process requires a hearing so that every
applicant may present his case, whether or not denial is threatened.
If after the entire investigation the character committee finds the
applicant unfit, he almost always has a statutory right to judicial re-
view, often by the state supreme court, although in some states an
intermediate court hears the initial appeal. The scope of review varies;
it may be limited to the "sufficiency of the evidence," or to determining
whether there has been "abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary action"
(the majority rule), or there may be de novo consideration."' Clearly,
constitutional objections would have to be reviewed under any rule,
and where such claims arise, a chance, of course, exists for ultimate
review by the United States Supreme Court.
II. Constitutional Limitations on the Character Requirement
Since bar admission is a state function, constitutional limitations
regarding it derive from the fourteenth amendment. The nature of
those restrictions is most simply described in the broad holding of a
unanimous Supreme Court in the bar admission case of Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners: "A state cannot exclude a person from the
practice of law or from any occupation in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'' 6 This means that the basis of the action may
not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory.1T This protection
was denied at one time on the theory that government licenses, ex-
penditures, and employment were mere privileges bestowed by the
12. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
18. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
14. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 201, 811-14 (1959); 7 CJ.S. Attorney and Client § llc (1937);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 266 U.S. 56, 40 n.4 (1961).
15. Armor., supra note 14, at 215; 7 C.Js., supra note 14, at § lie.
16. 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Accord, Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar. 377 U.S.
1, 6 (1964); Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963); NAACP v. Button,
371 US. 415, 428-29 (1963).
17. Cohen v. Hurley, 266 U.S. 117, 122-23 (1961); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168(1923); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195, 196 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 1-9
U.S. 114, 122 (1889); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 373-74 (1886). See also Ex
parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856) for a similar standard for bar admissions
in pre-fourteenth amendment days.
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state and not rights belonging to the individual.18 But this distinction
has been entirely eroded in a long line of cases starting with Wieman
v. Updegraff,19 so the Court in Schware could dismiss the near-
scholastic controversy with a footnote.20
In explanation of what the state may ask of the applicant, the Sch-
ware Court stated:
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an ap-
plicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.21
This basic standard applies to occupational licenses in general. Rig-
orous examinations may be required of dentists22 and doctors2 3 to
protect the public health "against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity"24 and a good character may be demanded of physicians
to prevent fraud or deception in the application of remedies .2 But the
applicant's race is not relevant to his ability and therefore not a per-
missible basis for denying him the right to operate a laundry.20 Nor
is past support of the Confederacy evidence of the unfitness of a priest
"to administer the sacraments of his church"2 7 or of a lawyer to prac-
tice before the Supreme Court.28 In each case, the question is whether
what is being required bears a direct and reasonable relationship to
what may be properly protected.
In order to determine what character qualifications may reasonably
be demanded of an applicant to the bar, it is necessary to consider first
the purposes of state regulation of character in bar admissions. The
18. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1439-42 (1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YAt L.J. 733,
739-41 (1964). See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.. 517
(1892) (leading case, opinion by Holmes, J.).
19. 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (public employment); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956) (public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax
exemption); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (Social Security benefits), Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (public office); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,
368 U.S. 278 (1961) (public employment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (un-
employment compensation benefits); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (public em-
ployment); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (public employment);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits).
20. 353 U.S. at 239 n.5.
21. Id. at 239.
22. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
23. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
24. Id. at 122.
25. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1898).
26. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
27. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 277, 319 (1866).
28. Ex parte Garland, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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practice of law essentially entails relationships with two groups of peo-
ple-the clients whom the attorney advises and represents, and the
personnel of the courts, i.e., judges, jurors, witnesses, and opposing
lawyers. The character requirement is primarily intended to protect
these people and their interests from improper dealings. Thus the
state is interested, for example, in preventing an attorney from stealing
his clients' money, betraying their confidence or misleading them so
as to stimulate litigation. Equally the state hopes to insulate the judi-
cial system and its personnel from interference of any sort, such as
bribery of jurors, subornation of perjury, or misrepresentations to a
court. 29
Although most admission cases involving criminal convictions can
be decided without rigorous analysis of the character standard, a recent
case involving a young man several times convicted of misdemeanors
for civil rights sit-ins forced the California Supreme Court to a care-
ful consideration of the requirement. 30 Aware of the constitutional
necessity of connecting character with fitness, the court sought to deter-
mine the functions of the standard and arrived at essentially the con-
clusion suggested above:
The purposes of investigation by the bar into an applicant's moral
character should be limited to assurance that, if admitted, he will
not obstruct the administration of justice or otherwise act unscru-
pulously in his capacity as an officer of the court.3 '
The good moral character requirement can hence be restated as a
demand that entering lawyers not possess personality traits which
potentially threaten either their prospective clients' interests or the
judicial process. Of course, the presence of dangerous characteristics
can only be determined by an examination of past acts which either
singly or in a pattern evidence the existence of such traits. For example,
29. As one commentator has summarized it:
Good character is required of an applicant both to assure future clients that they
may employ his services with confidence that their interests will be protected and to
guarantee that the candidate will not obstruct the administration of the judicial
process.
Note, "Good Moral Character" As a Prerequisite for Admission to the Bar: Inferences
to Be Drawn from Past Acts and Prior Membership in the Communist Party. 65 YALE
LJ. 873, 878-79 (1956). See also Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the Bar": A Constitutional
Approach to Non-Professional Conduct, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 351-52 (1965); Note,
Admission to the Bar---"Good Moral Character"-Consthtutional Protections, 45 N.C.L
REv. 1008, 1013 (1967); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPo,smLrrY, CA.,o.X0 1, ECI-2; In re
Mvonaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 67-68, 222 A.2d 665, 676-77 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
30. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal.
Rptr. M (1966.
31. 65 Cal. 2d at 462, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
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past acts of fraud or embezzlement may indicate a tendency to steal
from or cheat others which represents a threat to future clients. Sim-
ilarly, prior acts of bribery or misrepresentation may evidence an
inclination to deceive which could interfere with the proper admin-
istration of justice. Thus, the character requirement entails a pair
of inferences: the applicant must not have behaved in the past in a
manner which would imply the existence of personality traits which
in turn would suggest an unacceptable likelihood of future misbehav-
ior affecting adversely the interests of clients or the system of justice.
Another objective of the character requirement sometimes suggested
is protection of the reputation of the bar.32 This view is premised on
the notion that the bar and the judicial system must display the ap-
pearance of purity as well as being pure in fact.83 In effect, this means
that each applicant to the bar must meet not only a functional profes-
sional standard of fitness but also satisfy a general lay sense of ad-
equacy. Satisfaction of that standard, it is contended, would maintain
a high respect for lawyers and the administration of justice.84
There are several serious constitutional difficulties with this posi-
tion. The first is that a standard defined as "conduct which discredits
the reputation of the bar," or something similar,85 is too vague and
32. Cf. Bradway, supra note 3, at 23; Selinger & Schoen, supra note 29, at 347; 55
CAL. L. REV. 899, 901, 907 (1967); Note, Disciplining the Attorney for Extra-Pro essional
Misconduct, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 487, 494 (1961); Note, "Good Moral Character" As a Pre-
requisite for Admission to the Bar: Inferences to Be Drawn from Past Acts and Prior
Membership in the Communist Party, 65 YALE L.J. 873, 879-80 (1956), H. DRINxan, LEGAL
ETHicS 42, 44-46 (1953); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RE-
STRAINTS 138 (1956); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 29, 32: ABA CODE O'
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 9, EC9-1, 9-6 (Final Draft, 1969). E.g., Whitsltt v.
Bar Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 860, 868-69, 269 S.W.2d 699, 703 (1954); In re Rothrock, 16
Cal. 2d 449, 459, 106 P.2d 907, 912 (1940); In re Serritella, 5 Ill. 2d 392, 398, 125 N.E.2d
531, 534 (1955); In re Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 202, 247 N.Y.S. 168, 179 (1930); State
ex rel. Bar Ass'n v. Ablah, 348 P.2d 172, 175 (Okla. 1959); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53,
58-59, 222 A.2d 665, 670 (1966).
Although all but one of the relevant cases are disbarment proceedings, several cases
equate the admission and disbarment standards, and in any case the basic interests
sought to be protected by character controls for lawyers are identical whether the regula-
tion occurs on entrance to or potential exit from the profession. Pp. 1378-79 infra.
33. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIuILITY, CANON 9.
34. This purpose would appear to be thwarted by permitting members of the profes-
sion to make this lay evaluation. One commentator realized this and suggested that
members of the public be on the evaluating committee. Bradway, supra note 3, at 25-26.
35. "[A]ct has lowered prestige of the legal profession," Bradway, supra note 3, at 23;
"does act reflect on honor and integrity of the bar," Note, Disciplining the Attorney for
Extra-Professional Misconduct, supra note 3, at 494; "not to directly or indirectly reflect
discredit or criticism on the administration of justice," Bartos v. United States Dist.
Court, 19 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1927); "conduct . . . that . . . would cast a serious
reflection on the . . . reputation of the profession," State v. Murrell, 74 So. 2d 221, 244
(Fla. 1954); "misconduct such as to bring discredit upon the profession," In re Wells, 293
Ky. 205, 206, 165 S.W.2d 733, 734 (1943); "conduct . . . of a character to bring reproach
upon the legal profession," In re H- S-, 69 5.W.2d 325, 327 (Mio. Ct. App. 1934);
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ambiguous to meet due process requirements.3 0 While the "good moral
character" standard itself may also be arguably vague, it is, as Justice
Frankfurter pointed out in his concurrence in Schware,37 an old and
familiar legal concept which has through use attained a degree of cer-
tainty and clarity. The "reputation" standard, on the other hand,
comes with no such enlightening tradition or extensive use. Nor is it
rooted in any statutory language; it is solely a creation of the judicial
imagination. Thus judicial acceptance of the ambiguity of the "good
moral character" requirement has no bearing on the constitutionality
of a standard invoking "the reputation of the bar."38
The due process concept of vagueness originated in a series of cases
involving criminal statutes which were so unclear that they failed to
provide adequate warning as to the specific conduct prohibited. An
early case striking down a law punishing contractors who paid less than
"the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is
performed," 39 established the general rule:
"practices as cannot fail to bring discredit on the profession," "practices designed to
bring .. . profession into disrepute," State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Wiebusch,
153 Neb. 583, 588-89, 45 N.V.2d 583, 586-87 (1951); "brings . . . upon the profession
to which he belongs... disgrace and ridicule," In re Renehan, 19 N.M. 610, 679 (1914).
36. Since the constitutional limitations require in this case a rational connection
between the behavior or trait on which denial is grounded and the objectives of the regu-
lation, the objectives in fact become the standards by which the behavior is judged. Thus
it is valid to analyze the objectives as if they were statutory or regulatory standards.
37. 553 U.S. at 247-48.
38. Although courts accept and use the term "good moral character," there neverhas been a definitive decision as to its vagueness. The Supreme Court noted the pos-
sibility of such an objection in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957):
mhe term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost un-limited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes,
experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is
easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument
for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law.
The Court there used state judicial interpretations to narrow the meaning of the term
and avoid a constitutional decision. In the second Konigsberg case, the Court said that
California required the applicant to bear "the burden of proof of 'good moral character'
-a requirement whose validity is not, nor could well be, drawn in question here." 366
U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961). But Judge Motley, in her dissent in LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 299
F. Supp. 117 (SD.N.Y. 1969), notes that the "requirement" which the opinion daims
is beyond question is that of bearing the burden of proof, not that of "good moral
character." She further notes that the petitioner there did not attack the standard for
vagueness and thus the Supreme Court did not actually pass on te issue in that case,
nor in any subsequent one. Although the majority in I11admond, relying on that state-
ment in the second Konigsberg case, gives the vagueness argument short shrift, id. at 124,
Judge Moley treats the question as one of first impression and gives it lengthy con-
sideration. Basically because of the standard's age and extensive use, noted by Justice
Frankfurter in Schware, she at last finds the statute constitutional on its face, id. at 144(dissenting opinion), but then goes on to find New York's application and implementa.
ton of it to be impermissibly vague and broad. Id. at 146 (dissenting opinion).
The term "moral turpitude," usually found in disbarment statutes and employed in
admission cases because it is supposedly more specific and definite than "good moral
character" (p. 1378 infra), has also been questioned on vagueness grounds. Jordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 235 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
39. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 885, 388 (1926).
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[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law.
40
In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,41 the Court held that a law
which prohibited the setting of "an unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge in the handling ... [of] necessaries," 42 lacked any "ascertainable
standard of guilt" and that an attempt to enforce it "would be the
exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms
merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental to the public in-
terest . . .43
This rule of vagueness is not restricted to criminal cases.44 In a civil
case involving the same statute as Cohen Grocery, the Court explained:
"It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid but exaction
of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite
as really to be no rule or standard at all. ' '45 That principle vas re-
affirmed recently in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania.40 There the Court struck
down a statute which empowered a jury to impose costs on one acquit-
ted of a misdemeanor. Not finding any standards in the law, the Court
examined the judicial glosses which permitted imposition of costs
for conduct which was "reprehensible," "improper," or "outrageous
to morality and justice" and concluded: "If used in a statute which
imposed forfeitures, punishments, or judgments for costs, such loose
and unlimiting terms would certainly cause the statute to fail to mea-
sure up to the requirements of the Due Process Clause.' 47 Denial of
admission to the bar entails a loss which is far greater than the sum
Giaccio paid ($230.95) and carries with it at least as great a stigma
as that left on Giaccio's character. It is therefore also a "forfeiture" and
must be as carefully scrutinized for vagueness.
48
40. Id. at 391.
41. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Other important cases finding an impermissible vagueness in criminal statutes ate
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) and Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
45. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
46. 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
47. Id. at 404.
48. The suggestion that Giaccio provides a strong basis for attacking the character
standards of state licensing statutes is made in Note, 1966 DuKE L.J. 792 (1966).
Other cases involving civil statutes in which the Court entertained vagueness chal-
lenges were Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (deportation) and Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (commitment to mental hospital). In
another deportation case, a Circuit Court found impermissibly vague the standard of
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Applying a standard of "conduct which discredits the bar's reputa-
tion" would be, to paraphrase Cohen Grocery, like enforcing a stan-
dard of "all acts detrimental to the bar's interest," a standard which
is actually no standard at all. Would a fraternity "hazing" prank be
ruled as conduct discrediting the bar? Might a divorce and remarriage
by a prospective lawyer be grounds for his exclusion? Whatever the
nature of the acts considered, it is clear that law students of "common
intelligence must necessarily guess" 49 as to whether that conduct falls
within the broad dragnet of the "reputation" standard.
In addition to this due process vagueness attack, the proposed stan-
dard must face the objection that its ambiguity permits a construc-
tion encompassing activities protected by the first amendment. Fear of
such a construction might inhibit the free exercise of such rights by
those to be judged by the standard. The possibility of such a "chilling
effect" has led the Supreme Court to strike down similarly overbroad
standards as violative of the first amendment via the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
This "vagueness overbreadth" doctrine originated in criminal cases.
In Stromberg v. California,50 a law which prohibited the display
of a flag as a "sign ... of opposition to organized government" was
held invalid because "a statute which is so vague and indefinite as to
permit punishment of the fair use of this opportunity [for free polit-
ical discussion] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment."' r Statutes penalizing certain types of
speech 52 and publications featuring crime53 were similarly struck down.
Later development of this doctrine came in cases where public em-
ployees, usually teachers, were required to sign negative loyalty oaths
or lose their jobs. In one case the Court questioned whether a con-
scientious employee could take an oath that "I have not and will not
lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party"54 if he had voted for candidates of the Party or been a lawyer
for a Communist. The complete lack of "any... terms susceptible of
"'psychopathic personality" which, unlike the same standard in Pearson, had not re-
ceived a detailed judicial interpretation. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1962), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 374 US. 449 (1963).
49. P. 1360 supra.
50. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
51. Id. at 369.
52. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
53. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948). See also Note, Void.for.l'ague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L REv. 67 (1960).
54. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 279 n.l (1961).
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objective measurement"5 made such a construction possible and thus
rendered the oath impermissibly vague. Oaths requiring one "by pre-
cept and example to promote respect for the flag and the institutions
of the United States"5 6 and prohibiting "treasonable or seditious ut-
terances"7 were also invalidated because the phrases were so ambig-
uous as possibly to include protected speech and thereby discourage
teachers from fully exercising their constitutional rights.08
It is precisely such a danger that lurks in the vagueness of "conduct
which discredits the bar's reputation." Would participation in a legal
peace march or active support for Eldridge Cleaver's 1968 Presidential
candidacy constitute actions which when committed by an attorney-
to-be derogate the entire profession? Is support of the ACLU or
employment with the California Rural Legal Assistance sufficiently
notorious as to impugn the bar? The proposed standard is "lacking
in terms susceptible of objective measurement" and might well sweep
within its grasp activities protected by the first amendment, thereby
deterring the valid exercise of those rights. It is therefore unconsti-
tutionally overbroad and violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Having determined that the only legitimate objectives of the charac-
ter requirement are protection of clients and of the administration of
justice, it is now possible to inquire as to what conduct may permissibly
be made the basis for denial of admission. Clearly automatic denial
on the mere fact of conviction for any crime would be arbitrary. A con-
viction, for example, under a strict criminal liability food purity law,
by itself, is no evidence of any character defect. And many other crimes,
such as disorderly conduct or assault, which by their nature may raise
questions as to the offender's character, could not, without evidence
as to the surrounding circumstances, be determinative of the person's
unfitness to advise clients or participate in the judicial process. 0 This
principle was most simply stated in Schware: "In determining whether
a person's character is good, the nature of the offense which he has
committed must be taken into account.t 60
55. Id. at 286.
56. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 362 (1964).
57. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597 (1967).
58. See also Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11(1966).
59. Two commentators specifically include in this category of crimes objection to
military service on any grounds and encouraging others to violate the draft laws. Selinger
& Schoen, supra note 29, at 353.
60. 353 U.S. at 243.
1362
Vol. 78: 1352, 1969
Admission to the Bar Following Conviction
One type of offense recognized as irrelevant to one's fitness for a
licensed profession is a conviction for civil rights activities. In Hallinan
v. Committee of Bar Examiners,6' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered the relevance to the applicant's fitness of several convictions
for unlawful assembly, unlawful entry, and disturbing the peace, aris-
ing from civil rights sit-ins. After performing the functional analysis
of the character requirement noted above, the court said: "Prelim-
inarily, we note that every intentional violation of the law is not, ipso
facto, grounds for excluding an individual from membership in the
legal profession.162 It then went on to conclude that, because of their
motivation, the offenses did not constitute evidence of a threat to the
interests protected by the character requirement. In New York, the
city council passed an ordinance expressly stating that no license shall
be denied because of an arrest or conviction for civil rights demon-
strations. 63
The importance of the surrounding circumstances is not limited to
minor infractions or offenses perpetrated for a good end. In natural-
ization cases under the 1940 law which required "good moral charac-
ter" during the five years immediately proceeding the citizenship
application," the courts had ample opportunity to consider the rele-
vance of convictions for serious offenses. "Good moral character" was
found and citizenship granted to men who had been convicted of first
degree murder,65 voluntary manslaughter,66 negligent homicide,67 as-
sault with intent to murder and attempted automobile larceny.G°
In each case, some extenuating circumstance was found, either in the
commission of the crime or subsequently, to negate the impact of con-
viction. Of course, such cases do not prove that one convicted of first
degree murder is fit to be a lawyer; but they do show that no convic-
tion, regardless of the seriousness of the offense, is alone sufficient proof
of a lack of good moral character.
The legal profession has long recognized that only some violations
61. 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76,55 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1966).
62. 65 Cal. 2d at 459. See Yakov v. Board of Medical E-caminers, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 73 n.5,
435 P.2d 553, 557, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 789 (1968), for approval and reaffirmation of the
prindple. That case involved the sale of amphetamines without a prescription.
63. Civil Rights Demonstrators Protection Law, N.Y.C. AuN. CODE § AAS1-1.0, 2.0
(1963).
64. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 307, 54 Stat. 1137.
65. Petition of Sperduti, 81 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1949) and In re Balestrieri, 59
F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
66. In re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
67. In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
68. Marcantonio v. United States, 185 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1950).
69. United States v. Cunha, 209 F.2d 326 (Ist Cir. 1954).
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of the law are relevant to a lawyer's fitness to perform his duties. This
recognition has been capsulized in the phrase "crimes involving moral
turpitude" which is almost universally a standard in disbarment stat-
utes and has been frequently adopted in admission cases as a clarifica-
tion of the "good moral character" requirement.70 In Konigsberg v.
State Bar,7' the Supreme Court found California law to define "good
moral character" as "an absence of proven conduct or acts which have
been historically considered as manifestations of moral turpitude. '7 2
In Hallinan, the California Supreme Court, after confirming this as
a proper statement of its law, concluded that the standards for disbar-
ment and admission were therefore essentially identical. 73 Although
New Mexico's admission standard is also "good moral character," the
Court in Schware, when considering the Neutrality Act offense for
which the applicant had been indicted, stated that "it does not seem
that such an offense indicated moral turpitude. 7 4 The Court's only
explanation for the use of the term is a footnote citing its presence
in New Mexico's disbarment statute.75 Although some commentators
have assumed on the basis of Schware that the standards for admission
and disbarment are the same, 70 the only conclusion clearly suggested
is that a requirement that an applicant not have committed crimes
of moral turpitude is rationally connected to his fitness as a lawyer, and
hence a constitutionally permissible qualification.
In light of our earlier analysis of the due process elements of charac-
ter fitness, however, it is clear that moral turpitude as used in admis-
sions cases must be given a special meaning. The only constitutionally
valid requirement is that one not have committed crimes or acts which
demonstrate a personality trait that may endanger future clients or the
judicial process. "Crimes involving moral turpitude" are therefore
those offenses which necessarily entail or evidence such a trait.77
70. "Moral turpitude" is most elusive of definition, and courts have often turned in
desperation to the dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary suggests "an act of baseness, vile-
ness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man
or society in general," BLAca's LAv DIrIONARY 1160 (4th ed. 1951). The court in
Hallinan employed this definition. Webster's explains turpitude as "inherent baseness
or vileness of principles, words or actions." WEBsER's TtuRi Naw INTERNATIONAL DIc-
TIONARY 2469 (1968). Clearly the phrase denotes some serious deviation from accepted
norms indicating basic evil or bad character.
71. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
72. Id. at 263.
73. 65 Cal. 2d at 452-53.
74. 353 U.S. at 242.
75. Id. at 243 n.11.
76. 65 Cal. 2d at 452 n.5; see 55 CAL. L. REv. 899 n.1 But see pp. 1378-79 infra.
77. It would seem necessary to discuss the two cases in which the Supreme Court
indicated, in contradiction to Schware and the arguments presented here, that It was
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The judicial use of "moral turpitude" raises a question as to the rele-
vance of the public view of the morality of the crimes considered. The
offense Schware allegedly committed was attempting to recruit Amer-
ican volunteers for the Spanish Loyalists. The Court first said, "It does
not seem that such an offense indicated moral turpitude--even in
1940."1 s It then compared his activities to those of the many young
men who helped defend England and China before the United States'
entry into the war and said: "Few Americans would have regarded their
conduct as evidence of moral turpitude.-" In Hallinan, in determining
the moral turpitude involved in the applicant's civil rights convictions,
the court expressed
strong doubt that the leaders of the current civil rights movement
are today or will in the future be looked upon as so lacking in
constitutionally permissible to base professional discipline on the mere fact of conviction
for any crime. In Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), the Court upheld a
six month suspension of a doctor's license for his conviction and six month jail sentence
for refusing to bring certain documents before the House Un-Amnerican Activities Com-
mittee. Stressing the broad power of the state to regulate the practice of medicine to
protect the public, the Court held that the rule that any crime was grounds for discipline
was not so unreasonable as to violate due process. However in so conduding, the Court
gave great weight to the fairness and flexibility of the New York procedure for ad-
ministering discipline and little weight to the substantive rationality of the statute.
In Hawker v. New York, 170 US. 189 (1898), the Court upheld a conviction for un-
authorized practice of medicine under a law prohibiting further practice after conviction
for a crime. Although it admitted that the flat rule could cause hardship and unfairness
in some cases, the Court said it was not arbitrary for a legislature to decide that anyone
convicted of a crime lacked the necessary character to be a doctor. But the crime involved
there was abortion which most dearly relates to a doctor's fitness to practice and thus
on its specific facts, the holding in Hawker is not in conflict with Sdiware.
However, even the broader holding in both Barsky and Hawker is distinguishable
from Schware on other grounds. Schware is an admission case and Barsky and in effect
Hawker are disciplinary cases. As will be argued later (pp. 1378-79 infra) the standards
in the former situation are, and ought to be, broader and more flexible than in the
latter because actions done by an ordinary citizen are not to be viewed as harshly as
the same conduct by licensed professionals charged in some sense with a public trust.
Furthermore, Barsky explicitly referred to the practice of medicine as a "privilege
granted by the State under its substantial plenary power to fix the terms of admission."
347 U.S. at 451, and insofar as Hawker and Barsky rely on this view they have been over-
ruled by Schware which explicitly repudiated the right-privilege distinction in deter-
mining due process validity. 353 U.S. at 239 n.5.
But perhaps this search to distinguish the cases is not necessary, as Justice Harlan
indicates in his review of relevant past cases in his dissent in Spewack v. Klein, 385 US.
511, 523 (1967):
This Court has often held that the States have broad authority to devise both re-
quirements for admission and standards of practice for those who wish to enter the
professions, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189; Dent v. Brest Virginia, 129 U.S.
114; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 847 U.S. 442. The States may demand any qualifica-
tions which have "a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity,"
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239.
Thus Schware can be seen not as a deviation from but rather a refinement of the
Hawker-Barsky position.
78. 353 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 243.
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moral qualification that they should for that reason alone be pre-
vented from entering their chosen profession.80
These statements imply that the meaning of moral turpitude depends
on the contemporary community standards of morality. Such a view
however is directly at odds with the thrust of both Schware and
Hallinan towards a functional assessment of character fitness. If the
elements of fitness can be determined by an examination of the pro-
fessional responsibilities the applicant will bear, and if commission of
crimes can be the basis for denial of admission only if shown to con-
stitute a direct threat to the interests validly protected, then a shift
in the public view of the morality of that conduct should have no rel-
evance at all.81 Surely no court would alter its view of the unfitness of
an applicant convicted of embezzlement should the public decide that
the crime is not reprehensible if committed against the rich. Similarly,
it should be irrelevant whether the public supported England more
strongly than the Spanish Loyalists, or admired or scorned Martin
Luther King, Jr. The Supreme Court has in fact upheld this very view
in Cummings v. Missouri,8 2 where it invalidated an oath requiring
many professionals to deny any complicity with the Confederacy. Even
though it found that "the evasion of such service might be the subject
of moral censure,"83 the Court stated that:
There can be no connection between the fact that Mr. Cummings
entered or left the state of Missouri to avoid enrollment or draft
in the military service of the United States and his fitness to teach
the doctrines and adminster the sacraments of his church; nor can
a fact of this kind ... constitute any evidence of the unfitness of
the attorney or counsellor to practice his profession.8 4
80. 65 Cal. 2d at 461-62.
81. The leading case in the field of naturalization also defined the standard of "good
moral character" as a test whether "moral feelings, now prevalent generally in this
country [would] be outraged" by the conduct in question. United States v. Francloso, 164
F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1947). But aliens do not have a right to citizenship and the elements
of fitness for citizenship are much less susceptible of a functional determination. It Is
therefore much more validly arguable that the public view of morality should, In that
field of law, bear on the decision as to good character.
82. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
83. Id. at 827.
84. Id. at 319.
Because of the traditional ethical overtones of the phrase "moral turpitude" and
because it might be argued that public opinion may affect the rationality of the contlec-
tion between the act and moral fitness, some courts might consider society's view of a
crime's morality. In such cases, any change in that view between the time of the crime's
commission and the time of application for bar admission should be construed In the
applicant's favor. If at the time of its commission, the crime was thought not to involve
moral turpitude, the applicant may well have believed that the offense had a sort of
societal sanction, and it would be grossly unfair to penalize him for that reliance. If,
on the other hand, the offense was once, but is no longer, viewod as involving moral
1366
Vol. 78: 1352, 1969
Admission to the Bar Following Conviction
III. Relevance of a Conviction for Refusal of Induction to Fitness
to Practice Law
The constitutional limitations on a character requirement for bar
admission have now been established: Any requirement must be ra-
tionally related to fitness to practice law. Fitness consists solely of the
absence of traits that might endanger clients or the judicial system.
Denial of admission based on the mere fact of a criminal conviction
is arbitrary because lacking in proof of a connection to unfitness. And
"crimes involving moral turpitude" is a permissible standard only if
construed to mean offenses which indicate characteristics potentially
threatening the protected interests. It remains to confront the basic
problem posed by this Part: Is conviction for refusal of induction a
constitutionally valid basis for a finding of character unfitness?s5
The primary inquiry must be whether the nature of the offense it-
self supports an inference of dangerous character defects. The crime of
draft refusal necessarily entails only two elements: actual knowledge of
the obligation and deliberate refusal to comply with it.s° "Malignity
of purpose, depravity of disposition or fraud need not be shown."'s
The fact of conviction thus provides no indication of the moral stature
of the applicant. The act's immediate effect on others is an extremely
slight advancement of the date of induction for the registrants of the
draft refuser's board following him in the order of the call. Since the
refusal requires the induction of one more person to meet the board's
quota, it means that one registrant each month will be called tp one
month earlier than anticipated.88 It is of course possible that the refusal
turpitude, the latter view must be given weight for the issue is only raised and hence
to be decided at the time of admission.
85. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), where an oath required
of all ministers and attorneys denying any complicity with the Confederacy was invali-
dated, the Court came close to deciding this very question. See p. 1366 supra. If an
act such as flight to avoid the draft, which strongly suggests a lack of sense of obligation
to one's country and was said by the Court to be morally reprehensible, is considered
not to bear at all on fitness for the bar, then certainly the act of draft refu'al which
courts have stated does not reveal lack of patriotism or virtue, cannot constitute any
evidence of an applicant's unfitness to be a lawyer. See pp. 1375-78 infra.
The Cummings case at least suggests that the oath as really a political qualification
and hence invalid. If draft refusal is considered politically rather than morally motivated.
denial of admission because of the political beliefs, rather than because of the relevance
of the crime to fitness, would be a violation of the first amendment as incorporated
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
86. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1963).
87. In the Matter of S-, 5 I & N Dec, 425, 427 (1953) (administrative deportation
decision finding draft refusal not to be a crime involving moral turpitude).
88. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a), (b) (1963) (quotas
and order of call); Selective Service Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1631.1-1631.8 (1969) (quotas
and order of call).
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of one individual to serve will ultimately result in the induction of
another who would not otherwise be called. However, this possible
"injury" is both remote and uncertain; it certainly implies no inten-
tion or propensity on the part of the draft refuser to inflict harm on
others. Thus so far as its legal elements and its impact on others are
concerned, the act is a very personal one and does not in itself indi-
cate a threat to future clients.
It will be assumed here that, as is in fact generally the case, the
manner of the crime's commission also yields no unfavorable inference.
The offense is usually committed in public at the induction center
as the registrant refuses to take the symbolic step forward. Sometimes
the individual will simply not report to the induction center, either
communicating his intentions to his draft board s9 or to the district at-
torney or permitting the draft board to discover for itself the reason
for his non-appearance. In any case, the crime is almost always com-
mitted in a way that will immediately bring the matter to the attention
of law enforcement officers. Subsequent actions also often suggest a
willingness to submit to rather than a desire to avoid prosecution. The
charges themselves are often not contested; many plead guilty at the
arraignment"0 or present no evidence to contradict the prosecutor's
proof. Those who do contest their guilt usually claim only that they
were misclassified in that they deserved conscientious objector status.91
None of the courses of action mentioned in any way indicate a denial
of society's right to prosecute violations of its criminal laws, or an at-
tempt to obstruct the judicial process.
Since moral turpitude is not a necessary element of the offense and
since neither its consequences nor the manner of its commission re-
89. In a letter to the author dated July 22, 1969 (on file at the Yale Law Journal),
Richard W. Petherbridge who was convicted of refusal to report for induction in 1942
and was admitted to the California bar in June, 1950, stated that lie did not report to
the induction center and simply wrote his draft board so informing them. It is noted
in the opinion in Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 599, 414 P.2d 412, 415, 51 Cal. Rptr.
284, 287 (1966) that one of the plaintiffs informed his draft board of his decision and then
surrendered himself instead to the New York District Attorney.
90. Mr. Petherbridge, in his letter cited in note 89 supra, said that he pleaded nolo
contendere. Caleb Foote, who was twice convicted for refusing to report to civilian
work camp and was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1956, said, in a letter to the
author dated August 1, 1969 (on file at the Yale Law Journal) that he both times tried
to plead nolo contendere, was not allowed to, and then pleaded guilty.
91. The possibility that the refusal and conviction were based on improper classifica-
tion was one of the reasons given by the Naturalization and Immigration Board for
finding refusal of induction not to involve moral turpitude, supra note 87. The scope
of judicial review of draft classification, "no basis in fact," Estep v. United States, 827
U.S. 114, 122 (1946), is so narrow that conviction does not establish that there was no
error in classification. Thus the refusal may not have been a violation of a legal obliga-
tion but an assertion of a legal right.
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flects adversely on fitness to practice law, it is necessary to consider the
vital issue of motivation. It is assumed here92 that the applicant's crime
of draft refusal was motivated by a sincere conscientious objection to
any participation in the military, either because of objection to all
wars, to some wars or to the particular war in progress. He will prob-
ably have applied for conscientious objector status within the Selective
Service System and have been denied it because he failed to meet the
statutory requirement of an objection to "war in any form" grounded
in "religious training and belief.". In some cases the applicant will
have received non-combatant status from his draft board, a response
viewed as inadequate by the total objector. Unable to obtain satisfac-
tory recognition of his beliefs, he will have felt compelled to refuse
induction. His motivation will thus have been some legally unacknowl-
edged combination of ethical, humanitarian or religious principles
dictating non-participation in the organized process of taking human
lives. The question is whether such a motive is evidence of the lack of
character rightfully demanded of a lawyer.
There is some direct authority for the proposition that refusal of
induction for reasons of conscience does not indicate the kind of moral
imperfection that disqualifies a person for a profession. Matter of Kos-
ter v. Holz9 4 involved a denial of an application for an insurance
broker's license because the applicant was found not to be a "com-
petent and trustworthy person" (the statutory standard), a finding
based solely on his conviction for refusal of induction. The New York
Court of Appeals in a unanimous opinion stated that the applicant
could have been denied conscientious objector status for either of two
reasons. First, he might have been insincere, in which case he was trying
to avoid service, and his subsequent refusal of induction would be
evidence of bad character. Second, his objection might have been sin-
cere but not within the statutory definition, in which case his offense
was due to a deeply held conscientious belief. The court said that if
the Superintendent of Insurance did not go behind the conviction, he
would fail to distinguish those two possibilities, thereby perhaps deny-
ing an applicant a license "solely because he has adhered to his sincere
personal beliefs" and establishing "a qualification for holding a bro-
ker's license that is in no sense conclusive as to the untrustworthiness
or incompetency of the individual applicant or as to the professional
92. See note 5 supra.
93. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 US.C. App. § 456G") (1968).
94. 3 N.Y.2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287 (1958).
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standards of brokers, and thus would be violative of due process.' '0
The court then ordered a formal hearing at which the basis for denial
of conscientious objector status was to be determined, and instructed
that if the applicant's beliefs had been accepted as sincere but were
simply not within the statute, "then denial of his application for a
license where this is the only evidence of his untrustworthiness would
be arbitrary and capricious."0 0
If there is an answer to the position of the court in Koster, it must
be this: Even if the elements of the crime, its effects, and the manner
of its commission do not support an inference of unfitness, any inten-
tional violation of the criminal law may be indicative of a tendency
toward wrongdoing. Commission of a crime for a conscientious motive
indicates rejection of the basic premise of a society governed by law,
that the individual must subordinate his individual beliefs to those of
the majority expressed in law. This rejection suggests that an applicant
who alleges a conscientious motive is more likely than others to violate
the legal prohibitions controlling the practice of law. Furthermore, the
criminal law is essentially an expression of society's view of what is
moral. Any intentional breach of the law suggests a rejection of society's
moral values and hence the likelihood of failure to conform to them in
circumstances confronted by a lawyer. Lastly, the conscientious com-
95. Id. at 647, citing Schware for this proposition.
96. Id. at 648. But see In re Pontarellh, 393 Ill. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1946), in which a
lawyer was disbarred following his conviction for draft refusal. The attorney had been
denied conscientious objector status by both his draft and appeal boards. The court,
relying on an Illinois case which held that a conviction in Federal Court Is binding
and that one could not try to show one's innocence in another case, refused to go
behind his conviction to determine whether he was a sincere conscientious objector. That
citation clearly shows that the court misinterpreted the request to go behind tle record
of conviction. That request was not, or should not have been, to determine whether he
was a conscientious objector within the statutory definition and thus improperly con-
victed but rather a request to decide whether he in fact held some sort of conscientious
objection which motivated his crime and would help determine the issue of moral
turpitude. After refusing to go behind the conviction, the court held that the crime
involved moral turpitude because it was "an obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment
service." Id at 315. That offense had been held to involve moral turpitude in the case
of In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P. 40 (1920), which involved a conviction for false state-
ments made with the intent to promote the success of the enemy, cause disloyalty and
mutiny, or obstruct recruitment. Thus because of its refusal, for a mistaken reason, to
go behind the conviction, the court was led to analogize the offense improperly to a
crime of a wholly dissimilar nature which reflects much differently on a person's
character. The invalidity of the Pontarelli holding is recognized in Otsuka v. I-lite, 61
Cal. 2d 596, 612 n.15, 414 P.2d 412, 422 n.15, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 295 n.15 (1966). See also
In re Lindquist, 216 Minn. 344, 12 N.W.2d 719 (1944) (lawyer convictcd for refusal of
induction disbarred after failing to appear at hearing to bhow cause why lie should not be
disbarred); Matter of Greenberger, 265 App. Div. 343, 38 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1912) (lawyer who
pleaded guilty to failure to report for induction disbarred because New York law requires
automatic disbarment following conviction for a felony); Matter of Greenberger, 278 App.
Div. 925, 105 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1951) (reinstated). All of these cases are disbarment proceedings
where, as argued later (pp. 1378-80 infra), stricter, less flexible standards are involved.
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mission of the specific crime of draft refusal shows a particular moral
deficiency, lack of a sense of obligation to country. This moral flaw is
analogous to a lack of respect for the rights of others and for society's
institutions. Thus one can infer from it a greater than average likeli-
hood of a lack of a sense of obligation to clients and to the judicial
process.
The basic response to these contentions is that our society is gen-
eral, and the law in particular, have long recognized an exception to
the general premise that willful violation of the law reflects adversely
on a person's character. This exception is grounded in our under-
standing and formulation of the relation between citizen and state. It
is recognized that state exactions which are constitutionally valid and
necessary in the eyes of the majority may come in conflict with the
conscience of an individual. In such cases, the law, while properly
punishing the legal violation, has always acknowledged the moral
integrity of the violator. This recognition negates any inference of a
general rejection of the obligation to obey the majority's laws or
denial of the moral rules it enacts. Furthermore the specific state exac-
tion of military service has long been regarded as one of those most
legitimately subject to a conscientious objection. The existence in the
draft law itself of an exemption for conscientious objectors and nu-
merous judicial and administrative decisions all argue against drawing
from the fact of objection any inference of a moral deficiency, such
as lack of a sense of obligation to one's country.
The proposition that a conscientious violation of the law does not
suggest a general non-acceptance of the rule of law or of society's
moral code is most clearly supported by the decisions regarding nat-
uralization of aliens who harbored conscientious doubts as to their
ability to bear arms. In United States v. Schwimmer 7 the Court held
that a pacifist was not "attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion"98 as required by the naturalization law. Justice Holmes, in
dissent, said with regard to the moral implications of beliefs like those
held by the petitioner:
I would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make
the country what it is, that many citizens agree with the appli-
cant's beliefs and that I had not supposed hitherto that we
regretted our inability to expel them because they believe more
97. 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
98. Id. at 646.
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than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the
Mount.99
In the subsequent case of United States v. Macintosh,100 the Court held
that aliens with conscientious objections could not take the oath of
citizenship to support and defend the Constitution. Chief Justice
Hughes, in a famous dissent, joined by Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and
Stone, said:
While it has always been recognized that the supreme power of
government may be exerted and disobedience to its commands
may be punished, we know that with many of our worthy citizens
it would be a most heart-searching question if they were asked
whether they would promise to obey a law believed to be in
conflict with religious duty.1' 1
After reaffirming the power of the State to punish non-submission to
its exactions, he said: "But in the forum of conscience, duty to a
moral power higher than the State has always been maintained. The
reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-
abiding citizens."'1 2 These two dissents have gained significance not
solely due to the eminence of the judges who joined in them. The
views expressed in them were explicitly made the law of the land
when Schwimmer and Macintosh were overruled in Girouard v.
United States.'0a The Court there reasserted the morality of conscien-
tious disobedience by saying:
The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights
recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral power
higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the
authority of the State. 10 4
Similar acknowledgment of the moral rectitude of those who com-
mit serious violations of the law in obedience to conscientious scruples
is found in Repouille v. United States.'0o There the issue was whether
an alien who had committed euthanasia on his thirteen year old,
mentally incompetent, blind, mute and physically deformed son lacked
99. Id. at 655.
100. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
101. Id. at 631.
102. Id. at 633.
103. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
104. Id. at 68.
105. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the requisite "good moral character" for citizenship. Judge Learned
Hand wrote for the Court:
[W]e all know that there are great numbers of people of the most
unimpeachable virtue, who think it morally justifiable to put an
end to a life so inexorably destined to be a burden to others ....
Nor is it inevitably an answer to say that it must be immoral to
do this, until the law provides security against the abuses which
would inevitably follow, unless the practice were regulated. Many
people-probably most people-do not make it a final ethical test
of conduct that it shall not violate law; few of us exact of our-
selves or of others the unflinching obedience of a Socrates. There
being no lawful means of accomplishing an end, which they be-
lieve to be righteous in itself, there have always been conscien-
tious persons who feel no scruple in acting in defiance of a law
which is repugnant to their personal convictions and who even
regard as martyrs those who suffer by doing so. In our own his-
tory, it is only necessary to recall the Abolitionists. 100
Although Hand found the crime in that case to be one still con-
sidered morally unjustifiable and hence indicative of lack of good
character, his guiding principle was that a violation of the law,
even one as serious as manslaughter, need not be inconsistent with a
virtuous character.
This position was reiterated in Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners,107 a case more directly in point since it involved a deter-
mination of "good moral character" for admission to the bar. There,
immediately after finding that Hallinan's civil rights sit-in convictions
did not involve moral turpitude, the court said:
If we were to deny to every person who has engaged in... non-
violent civil disobedience, and who has been convicted therefor,
the right to enter a licensed profession, we would deprive the
community of the services of many highly qualified persons of the
highest moral courage.los
The particular legal command to perform military service has long
been singled out as the one most understandably subject to a con-
scientious objection. The reason for this is undoubtedly that accep-
tance of the obligation may well confront the individual with the
ultimate moral question: May one kill another human being? The
law defining the military obligation itself has long made provision
106. Id. at 153.
107. 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P-2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
108. Id. at 462; 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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for those with conscientious scruples, and the exemption has been
steadily broadened both by Congress and the courts.
The history of the exemption indicates an ever-increasing under-
standing of and willingness to recognize the almost infinite variety of
possible conscientious objections to military service. The 1864 draft
act provided combat exemptions for members of religious denomina-
tions which prohibited the bearing of arms.10 In the 1917 law, those
belonging to "a well-recognized religious sect . . . whose existing creed
or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form"110
were relieved of combatant duties. In 1940, the exemption was
broadened to include "any person, who by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.""' It also provided for complete exemption from military service
for those opposed even to noncombatant duty. In 1948, Congress
re-enacted the same clause but added this explanation:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an indi-
vidual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation but does not
include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code."12
In United States v. Seeger,"1 the Supreme Court unanimously broad-
ened the exemption by interpreting the phrase "belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being" to mean a "belief that . . . occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.' "1 4 In 1967 Congress
deleted the "Supreme Being" clause,"15 an action which, whatever
Congress' intentions, clearly makes for an even broader interpreta-
tion of "religious belief." 116
109. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6. Military exemptions were originally
established by the colonies, and were adopted by their successor states. United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965).
110. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
111. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885.
112. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604.
113. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
114. Id. at 166.
115. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 US.C. App. § 4560) (1968).
116. It can be argued from the legislative history that Congress intended by its
change to narrow the exemption. Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 20, 21, 34, 35, 617 (1967); Hearings on the Extension
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act Before the House Committee on
Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2552, 2636 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House
Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 90 U.S. CODE CONGREssIONAL
AND ADIINISTRATIVE NEWS 1490 (1967); CONF. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
90 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 1516 (1967). But see 113 CONG.
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The Seeger decision in particular recognizes that however one de-
fines the acceptable objection there will always be parallel beliefs
which are equally conscientious and result in the same or similar ob-
jections. Beliefs such as a purely moral, non-religious objection to all
or to some wars, or a Catholic or other religious objection solely to
unjust wars, can occupy a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the more orthodox beliefs recognized by the statute. An
applicant to the bar who holds such a parallel view and who refuses
induction because he is unable to get the exemption is no more im-
moral, unpatriotic or likely to break laws than one who obtained
recognition of his beliefs and hence was not compelled to break the
law.217 The basic reason given for not further expanding the statutory
recognition of conscientious beliefs is that a broader exemption would
be extremely difficult to administer.18 But in the matter of bar admis-
sions, where the number of such cases will be far fewer and the man-
power, time, and resources available for the necessary investigations
will be proportionately far greater, there is no valid reason for denying
recognition, to any objection to military service on grounds of
conscience.
Judicial decisions in other areas of law have reaffirmed the national
acceptance of conscientious objections to military service found in the
draft law. Chief Justice Hughes in his dissent in Macintosh11 spoke
of such objections in his discussion of the general issue of legal con-
flicts with conscience:
And we also know, in particular, that a promise to engage in war
by bearing arms, or thus to engage in a war believed to be un-
just, would be contrary to the tenets of religious groups among
our citizens who are of patriotic purpose and exemplary con-
duct. 20
The same attitude prevailed in Otsuka v. Hite,'-" where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was called on to determine whether draft re-
R~c. S8054 (daily ed. June 12, 1967); 113 CONG. REc. H6245, 6266 (daily ed. Ma) 25,
1967).
One court has recently gone quite a bit be)ond Seeger in broadening the exemup.
tion on constitutional grounds. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
117. Application of Steinbugler, 297 N.Y. 713 (1947) (conscientious objection recog-
nized by law is not evidence bearing upon character or fitness for admission to the bar).
118. Cf. 1967 House Hearings 2636 (testimony of Gen. Lewis Hershey, director of
the Selective Service System).
119. P. 1372 supra.
120. 283 U.S. at 631-32.
121. 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
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fusal constituted an "infamous crime" within the meaning of the state
constitutional provision disenfranchising the perpetrator of such an
offense. After finding the term to mean a crime which brands the
offender "morally corrupt and dishonest" and a "threat to the integrity
of the elective process,' 22 the court turned to consider whether the
plaintiffs had committed such a crime. It first noted that although
their beliefs had been recognized by the Selective Service System, the
classifications they received "required a greater degree of participa-
tion in the military effort than their religious and humanitarian
principles would allow.' 23 It then found that each man had been
"impelled by obedience to a higher law and by religious and humani-
tarian concern for his fellow man" and that "the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized principles such as these to be worthy of
the highest respect and protection,' '12 4 quoting Girouard and Seeger
at length. On this basis, the court held that the plaintiffs' crime did
not brand them as morally corrupt and dishonest men. In Hallinan,
the same court, after referring to those who committed civil disobedi-
ence as "persons of the highest moral courage,"'u2 analogized Halli-
nan's conduct to the draft refusals dealt with in Otsuka and went on
to find that his crimes did not entail moral turpitude and therefore
did not disqualify him to practice law. Thus it seems clear that the
California court considers draft refusal no indication of moral corrup-
tion, dishonesty, or lack of a sense of obligation to others or to country,
and therefore no evidence of unfitness to practice law. 120
122. Id. at 611.
123. Id. at 613.
124. Id.
125. P. 1373 supra.
126. But see In re Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
813 (1961), where an attorney from another state who had received conscientious objector
status but refused to perform alternative service was denied admission to the bar. Al.
though the standard in Washington is "good moral character," the court appeared to
rest its decision on a standard of good citizenship not relied on by the bar character
committee nor enunciated in the statute. The court was very much irked by the fact
of the applicant's refusal despite official recognition of his conscientious beliefs and
referred to "his felonious denial of any duty related to the enjoyment of these individual
liberties." It then concluded that:
A loyal and discerning citizen is aware of his great heritage of liberty and acknowl-
edges his duty to do his share in preserving it. Without a sense of duty, the ap-
plicant does not measure up to the standard of citizenship rightly expected of an
attorney at law. Id. at 69.
The opinion thus denies admission solely for lack of fitness as a citizen. This is a totally
arbitrary requirement since it is unrelated to fitness as a lawyer. Furthermore, it ctcates
a vague standard with constitutional infirmities similar to those noted in the suggested
standard of "conduct which discredits the reputation of the bar," pp. 1358-62 supra. it
any case, this decision is not a precedent for cases where the conscientious objection was
not recognized by the Selective Service, since the case relies on the applicant's refusal
to perform any service in spite of his favorable classification. The opinion in Otsuha
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A deportation case decided by the Naturalization and Immigration
Board 27 indicates a similar conclusion as to the inferences to be drawn
from draft refusal. The question was whether an alien who had re-
fused induction had committed a crime involving moral turpitude
and should therefore be deported. After reviewing the crime's ele-
ments and the manner of its commission, the Board went on to note
that a conviction for draft refusal does not terminate liability for in-
duction; thus it could not be motivated by cowardice or any lack of
sense of obligation to country. Moreover, the Board noted:
Recognition in the law of the refusal of religious conscientious
objectors to serve on the basis of conscience, and the respect for
such refusal, makes it illogical to view as a depraved act refusal
of other conscientious objectors who may be just as sincere as the
first group but whose bases for objection rest on non-religious
grounds.' 8s
Immediately following that statement, the Board gave a most succinct
summary of all the reasons'-9 why the crime of draft refusal does not
involve moral turpitude:
The element just discussed; the fact that a depraved mind or
purpose is not required for conviction; the possibility that the
termed the Brooks case not "persuasive." 64 Cal. 2d at 612, 414 P.2d at 422, 51 Cal. Rptr.
at 295.
127. In the Matter of S-, 5 I : N Dec. 425 (1953).
128. Id. at 428.
129. One possible argument for conscientious draft refusers which has not been men-
tioned because it does not derive from general principles regarding bar admissions but
rather from the particular motive of draft refusal was suggested sketchily in the petition
for certiorari in In re Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 813 (1961). This argument is best structured along the lines of a subsequent case,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968). The Supreme Court there held tlmt a Seventh
Day Adventist could not be disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits because
she would not work on Saturdays for religious reasons. After finding that there was a
clear burden on the free exercise of religion, since the woman bad to violate a basic
tenet of her religion or forfeit the benefits, the Court said that only a compelling state
interest could justify such a burden. Finding only an interest in preventing fraudulent
claims, which it found enforceable by less burdensome means, the Court held there was
no justification for this infringement of religious freedom. A bar applicant could argue
that his conscientious refusal of induction was an exercise of his religious freedom
analogous to Mrs. Sherbert's refusal to work and as such could only be burdened when
a substantial state interest compelled it. His conviction and sentence were of course
justified by the country's overriding interest in raising an army. However denial of
admission to the bar is a separate and further burden which must be justified by its
own compelling state interest. Since his beliefs and past exercise of them do not indicate
a threat to the only two compelling state interests-protection of client's interests and
of the judicial process-there is no justification for the severe burden of exclusion front
his chosen profession. Thus in addition to the general substantive due process argument
which any applicant may use to combat a denial for conduct not rationally related to the
functions of the character requirement, the conscientious draft refuser has an argument
which turns on the same lack of rational connection but which is grounded in a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, the freedom of religion.
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conviction may be the result of ill advice or misclassification;
the fact that the violation does not necessarily involve fraud and
that it is an open act which of necessity is brought to the attention
of law enforcement officers and which results not in evasion of
service but punishment, followed by further subjection to ser-
vice-all these matters compel the conclusion that the portion of
the law under consideration does not define a crime which is base,
vile, or depraved. Since a crime involving moral turpitude is not
involved, the proceedings should be terminated. 180
Since the crime does not involve immorality or any antisocial ten-
dencies, it cannot be evidence of a likelihood of misbehavior en-
dangering clients or the administration of justice, and therefore is not
indicative of unfitness to practice law.
IV. Breadth of the "Good Moral Character" Standard
Even an adverse finding on the question of the moral turpitude of
draft refusal would not be conclusive of the character issue. The stan-
dard of "crime involving moral turpitude" has been imported into the
admissions process from the disbarment statutes'8 ' because it is more
specific and has received greater judicial interpretation than the term
"good moral character" and because it was realized that the objective of
both proceedings is identical-the exclusion from the profession of all
persons morally unfit to practice. But the use of "moral turpitude" in
admission cases does not alter the fact that the statutory standards for
admission are universally different from those for disbarment. Con-
sideration of the possible explanations for this dissimilarity yields the
conclusion that the "good moral character" requirement is in fact a
broader and more flexible one than "moral turpitude."
The most common explanation for the difference in the standards is
130. 5 I & N Dec. at 428-29.
Some success apparently has been obtained with arguments such as these. In the peti-
tion for certiorari in In re Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denitd,
365 U.S. 813 (1961), there is a list of six men who were admitted to the bar, following
conviction in four cases for refusal of induction, in one for refusal to report to civilian
public service camp, and in the last for refusal to complete a questionnaire (a later
conviction for refusal to work in camp was reversed). A seventh who had twice been
convicted for draft refusal was permitted to take the bar exam in North Carolina, and
was not admitted apparently only because of academic inadequacy. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 22, Application of Brooks, 365 U.S. 813 (1961). Letters from three of these
individuals and the widow of a fourth, detailing their personal experiences relating to
admission to the bar, are on file at the Yale Law Journal.
131. Although some courts, like the one in Hallinan, explicitly decide that "moral
turpitude" should be applied in admission cases, 65 Cal. 2d at 453, others, like the Su-
preme Court in Schware, simply assume its applicability, 353 U.S. at 242.
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that the practicing lawyer, unlike the bar applicant, has a property
right, a vested interest, in his practice, and hence disbarment should
only be inflicted where the breach of duty is clear and unforgivable. 32
The California Supreme Court has recognized that this argument is
untenableY 3 The applicant who has expended time, energy and a
large amount of money on legal education has as much a right to prac-
tice as the practicing lawyer, and suffers a similar if perhaps somewhat
less severe loss when excluded from the profession.134
A second and more persuasive explanation is that certain acts are
intolerable and justify immediate expulsion when committed by an
attorney, who by virtue of his license and role as an officer of the
court is endowed with something of a public trust. The same acts
committed by an ordinary citizen at some time prior to asking for
that trust cannot be taken as conclusive proof of inability at the time
of the request to live up to that responsibility. Hence a broader in-
quiry must be made, and less inflexible rules used to determine fit-
ness at the time of application. This is the only interpretation consis-
tent with the use of the moral turpitude standard in admission cases.
It would make no sense to use that standard if it were intended to
provide the degree of protection only due practicing attorneys. But
it is reasonable to employ the rule-as a first step in a broad investi-
gation of character-to pinpoint past objectionable acts which require
special attention from the examiners and thorough explanation by
the applicant.
This theory seems substantiated by judicial practice. In Schware,
the Supreme Court considered the inherent evil of each charge made
against the applicant: the use of aliases, the arrests, the Neutrality
Act indictment, and membership in the Communist Party. But in
each case, although finding nothing actually wrong with the actions,
it referred to the length of time elapsed since the events, and treated
that factor as indicating the irrelevance of those events to Schware's
132. Cf. Note, "Good Moral Character" As a Prerequisite for Admission to the Bar:
Inferences to Be Drawn from Past Acts and Prior Membership in the Communist
Party, supra note 30, at 873-74 & nn.24; Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners. 65 Cal.
2d 447, 451-52 & n.3 (1966).
133. 65 Cal. 2d at 452 n.3.
134. The organized bar appears to acknowledge this fact for its publications have
frequently stated that one who has completed law school and passed the bar exam gains
something of a vested right and that bar examiners and courts should be most careful
not to disqualify them for character unfitness unless the case is clear and compelling.
Powell, President of the ABA, Comments on the Subject of the Panel Discussion (Charac-
ter Aspects of Admission to the Bar), 34 TmE BAR MxAmNEP 116, 119 (1965); ABA.
REPORT Or THE ADVisORY AND FDITORIAL CozanirE ON BAR E.XAvmNATIO.NS AND ADmt.0
To PRarcE LAw 145 (1951); A MANUAL FOR B.,R F.X.AMINERS 112 (1951).
1379
The Yale Law Journal
character at the time of application. 135 In Otsuka v. Elite, where the
standard was commission of an "infamous crime," the Court made sev-
eral references to the fact that twenty years had intervened since the
offenses, during which time the plaintiffs had lived exemplary lives.13 "
The dissent noted that these factors seemed to influence the court's
finding that the crime did not brand the men morally corrupt and
dishonest.137 In Hallinan, the court said that most of the fistfights ad-
duced as evidence of unfitness took place when the applicant was an
adolescent, and held that "youth and inexperience" were mitigating
circumstances. 138 Thus the courts have recognized that the discovery of
an act or offense involving moral turpitude does not conclude an in-
quiry into good character, and that all evidence in mitigation of the
crime and in proof of present good moral character is relevant' 83 and
must be considered by the examining body.
40
The most significant evidence that can be presented in mitigation
of a crime held to entail moral turpitude and in proof of present good
character is a presidential pardon.' 4 ' A pardon annuls the unfortunate
135. 353 U.S. at 241, 242, 243, 246.
136. 64 Cal. 2d at 598, 599, 606, 414 P.2d at 414, 415, 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 286, 287, 291.
137. Id. at 615, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297, 414 P.2d at 425.
138. 65 Cal. 2d at 471, 421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
139. In Schware, the Court went so far as to suggest that one of tile factors to be
borne in mind, especially where minor doubts are raised by the evidence, is the state's
"ample means" to discipline an admitted lawyer for future misconduct, 353 U.S. at 247
n.20.
140. It is settled administrative law that a trial-type (evidentiary) hearing Is requlrcd
for disputed adjudicative facts. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TelwrisE 412 (1958).
Many cases hold that a license applicant's good character, trustworthiness, and fitness
belong to that class of facts. Id. at 422-23. Thus a bar applicant could definitely testify at a
hearing before the character committee as to the motives for his crime, past acts and state-
ments which evidence the sincerity and consistency of his beliefs, his age and immaturity
at the time of the crime, his good behavior before and especially since the crime, and any
evidence of rehabilitation, if he desired to show that. Due process, however, is not gen-
erally thought to afford an argument-type administrative hearing at which the applicant
can argue points of law or interpretation of facts. Id. at 434. Thus the character commit-
tee is not obligated to permit the applicant to argue that draft refusal is not a crime
involving moral turpitude or that his conviction is not conclusive of his present moral
character. Hence if the committee did not agree with the argument in the text, It might
improperly exclude some of the types of evidence suggested above and the applicant would
be powerless to change that decision without going to court. It is not clear in what cate.
gory would fall evidence that his beliefs are in accord with traditional Western morality
and accepted ethical principles. The applicant, of course, should insist that this is evi.
dence of the "goodness" of his character and not argument on the legal issue of moral
turpitude. Of course all issues, both legal and factual, may be argued before a reviewing
court.
141. Presidential pardons can be obtained in two ways--either through a general
amnesty or simultaneous pardon of a large group of similar offenders or through an
individual application. On December 23, 1933, President Roosevelt proclaimed a pardon
of all persons convicted under § 5 of the 1917 draft law, Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15
§ 5, 40 Stat. 76, which made failure or refusal to register for the draft a misdemeanor.
Presidential Proclamation No. 2068. On December 23, 1946, President Truman estab.
lished a Presidential Amnesty Board which was authorized to review the approximately
6000 convictions under the 1940 draft law and to make recommendations regarding
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stigma of conviction and represents that the person is sufficiently re-
habilitated to take his equal place alongside other citizens. 142 The
draft refuser who has received a pardon can argue that, whatever moral
imperfection the crime may have evidenced, by the time of the par-
don's issuance he had changed sufficiently to be entrusted with the
full rights of citizenship, among which is the right to follow one's
chosen profession.
Those without pardons can present other evidence to establish pres-
ent good moral character. One approach is to show in mitigation of
the offense that one was young and immature at the time of its com-
mission.143 Another approach is to argue one's rehabilitation by show-
ing subsequent good behavior. This approach was most strikingly suc-
cessful in the citizenship cases involving much more serious crimes. 44
Evidence of subsequent good behavior may be the only proof avail-
able to the applicant who insists that he has not abandoned the prin-
ciples which prompted the offense, and therefore cannot claim
rehabilitation.14 5
pardons. Executive order No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14645 (1946). Exactly a year later.
December 23, 1947, pursuant to the recommendations of the Board. Truman grantedfull pardons to 1523 of those men. Presidential Proclamation No. 2762. 12 Fed. Reg.
8731-44 (1947).
The other way to obtain a pardon is by individual application. The procedures for
obtaining such a pardon are to be found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.9 (1969).
142. In a letter to the author dated Aug. 25, 1969. on file at the Yale Lau, Journal, theUnited States Pardon Attorney stated that a pardon is granted if it is determined that
"the petitioner has demonstrated over a reasonable period of time that he is rehabilitated
and is living a useful and law-abiding life."
The specific effect of a pardon is to restore to the convicted person all of his cil
rights, which may include his previous position and rights regarding a state liceme.
office, or employment. 67 C.J.S. Pardons § 11 (1950); 39 Amr. Jun. Pardon, Reprieve andAmnesty §§ 52, 59 (1942); Slater v. Olson, 230 Iowa 10O5, 299 NAV. 879 (1941). The fed-
eral view of the meaning of a pardon is broader than that of most states. Ex parteGarland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); United States ex rel. Forino v. Garflinkel, 69F. Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. Pa. 1947); 67 C.J.S. Pardons § 11 (1950). Since refusal of induc.
tion is a federal crime, and the pardon is a presidential one, the federal interpretation
of a pardon's effect should be binding, even in state court proceedings.
143. This approach proved quite successful in In re Sullivan, 57 Mont. 592, 189 P.770 (1920), involving tardy objections to a lawyer's admission baed on his statements
during World War I that the country had no cause for war and that he had not and
would not register for the draft. After condemning his conduct as lacking in moral fiber
and worthy of contempt, the court said:
However we are not prepared to say that the applicant is so far deficient in moral
character that he cannot become a useful member of society and an honorable and
useful member of the bar. His youth, inexperience and immaturity of mind offer
something in mitigation if not in excuse of his conduct.
Id. at 594-95, 189 P. at 770-71.
The court suspended him for 8 months but one feels certain that if te objections hadbeen timely, the court would simply have admitted him with little more than a lecture.
144. Notes 65-69 supra.
145. Two other arguments were unsuccessfully suggested for such applicants in In reBrooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied 365 US. 813 (1961). One
was that the moral defect involved in the crime was temporary and terminated with
the war which evoked it. The other was that the crime could have no future implications
since the applicant had passed the age of draft liability.
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Conclusion
In order to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the character requirement for admission to the bar must be
rationally related to one's fitness to practice law. The only legitimate
purposes of the requirement are protection of future clients and the
proper administration of justice. Therefore, the only permissible de-
mand is that the applicant not possess a quality of character which
threatens those interests. Conscientious refusal of induction, whether
considered in terms of its legal elements, its inevitable effects, the
manner of its commission or its motive, is not a crime which neces-
sarily indicates such a quality and thus cannot constitutionally be the
sole basis for denial of admission. Furthermore, an applicant must
be permitted to rebut any adverse inference drawn from the convic-
tion-the law asks not that one's past be spotless but only that one's
present moral character be good.
Part Two: Survey of State Law
The purpose of this section is to review the procedures used by
selected states to determine the character fitness of applicants who have
been convicted of a felony such as draft refusal. Of course the constitu-
tional issue in a refusal of bar admission grounded solely on the con-
viction is independent of state procedures and standards. Nevertheless,
the peculiarities of his particular state are important to the applicant:
if state law is favorable to him, he may never have to raise a constitu-
tional issue at all, while the course of litigation at the state level will
affect his chances if the applicant does have to go into federal court.
Although all states require applicants to establish their "good moral
character," there is little uniformity in state law governing bar admis-
sions. 146 Three important variables will govern the chances of success of
draft law felons. First, some states have a statute prescribing the effect
of a felony conviction on bar admission and/or disbarment, while
others do not.147 Second, most states have slightly different ways of
146. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 301 (1959); 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law
§§ 8-11 (1963); 7 C.JS. Attorney and Client §§ 4-11 (1937).
147. Compare pp. 1385-88 infra (California), pp. 1389-91 infra (District of Columbia),
pp. 1391-94 infra (New York), and pp. 1400-01 infra (Texas), with pp. 1396-97 infra (Con.
necticut) and pp. 1398-99 infra (Illinois). See also APPENDIX, p. 1402 infra.
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defining-and methods of applying-a moral turpitude standard for
determining the relevance of particular behavior to a bar applicant's
moral character.148 Several states, on the other hand, do not appear to
apply such a standard at all. 49 The third variable is the scope of review
by the state courts of the determinations of "fact" and "law" by the
local bar's subcommittee on character.150
Six jurisdictions were selected for detailed study.15' Three general
types of statutory variation were discovered: (1) jurisdictions in which
conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
is specified by statute as "cause"152 for disbarment and in which there
is de novo review in the courts (California and the District of Colum-
bia); (2) jurisdictions in which there is no statutory provision re-
garding the effect of a criminal conviction of any kind on disbarment
or bar admission and court review of character committee findings is
strictly limited (Connecticut and Illinois); and (3) jurisdictions in
which a convicted felon is prohibited by statute from practicing law
(New York and Texas).15 3
148. On the general subject of moral turpitude standards, see pp. 1363-72 supra. Cor.
pare, e-g., California (ad hoc consideration of all criminal behavior in terms of circum-
stance of its occurrence, its specific relevance to practice of law, and evidence of actor's
subsequent rehabilitation), pp. 1385-88 infra; District of Columbia (rehabilitation of
criminal actor not generally taken into account by character committee), pp. 1389-91 infra;
Connecticut (vague moral turpitude standard with no indication that a fmctional ap-
proach would be used to determine the relevance of a criminal conviction to the practice
of law), pp. 1396-97 infra; Illinois (confusion about the application of moral turpitude
standards used in judging non-criminal behavior to criminal convictions), p. 1399 infra.
149. See, e-g., Texas, pp. 1400-01 infra.
150. For discussion of this variable in several jurisdictions, see pp. 1384-85 infra (Cali-
fornia) p. 1389 infra (District of Columbia), p. 1391 infra (New York), pp. 1395-95 infra
(Connecticut), p. 1398 infra (Illinois), p. 1400 infra (Texas).
151. Selections were made on the basis of the authors' subjective estimate that there
are more draft felons as well as bar applicants in the jurisdictions chosen than there are
in most, if not all, other jurisdictions.
152. Summary disbarment is not required by either the California or the District of
Columbia statutes upon proof that the defendant has been convicted of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude. Both statutes arguably allow the attorney-defendant to rebut a
statutory claim that he should be disbarred, even though his conduct involved moral
turpitude. In California the defendant's introduction of evidence of his rehabilitation
presumably would allow such a rebuttal to succeed (see p. 1388 infra), although
in the District of Columbia it would probably not be successful (see p. 191 infra).
153. On the basis of these statutory variations, preliminary rough estimates of how
draft law felons would fare in each state can be made: (1) jurisdictions like California and
the District of Columbia would be most receptive to draft refusers because a moral
turpitude standard binds administrative determinations by the bar, which, in turn, may
be reviewed by the courts on the basis of that standard; (2) jurisdictions like Connecticut
and Illinois would be less receptive to draft law felons because the bar is not necessarily
bound to follow a moral turpitude standard, and its determinations may be reviewed by
the courts only when there is a dear abuse of administrative discretion (see pp. 1394-98
infra); (3) jurisdictions like New York and Texas would be least receptive to draft
law felons because no convict may practice law, even if his felony did not involve moral
turpitude. Further analysis, however, reveals that the above generaliations are not
always accurate. In the detailed studies below, for example, New York Is shown to be
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I. California
A. Admission Procedure
The State Bar is empowered by statute to promulgate rules reg-
ulating the character' 54 investigations of bar applicants.'" While the
California Supreme Court is at the head of the admissions structure
and may entertain a direct appeal by any applicant whose certification
is refused by the Committee of Bar Examiners,5 " the Committee con-
ducts a full investigation of the applicant's character in the first in-
stance.'5 7 These investigations are in fact carried out by three-man
subcommittees whose determinations the full committee may choose
to review notwithstanding the applicant's right to appeal directly to
the Supreme Court. 58
California procedures governing character inquiries are more pre-
cisely articulated by statute than those of any other American juris-
diction.159 As in other states, the applicant has the burden of proof and
must show by a preponderance of evidence that he possesses good
more receptive than both Connecticut and Illinois to the draft refuser who seeks bar
admission, despite the existence of a per se rule in the former barring felons from the
practice of law. See pp. 1391-94 infra.
154. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(c) (West 1962).
155. RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
FoIl. § 6068 (West Supp. 1968).
156. Id. Rule I, § 11. See March v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 63 Cal. Rptr. 399, 433
P.2d 191 (1967) (Supreme Court has full review powers over all aspects of a Committee of
Examiners' hearing). It has been well established by California case law that the findings
of the Committee of Examiners (or any subcommittee thereof), while given great weight,
are not binding on the California Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Alkow, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912,
415 P.2d 800 (1966), and cases cited therein.
157. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6068, Rule I, § 2 (West 1962).
158. Id. Rule X, § 101.1 (as amended to May 17, 1968). Upon denial of moral character
certification by the Bar Examiners, an applicant must wait two years before reapplying
for certification to the Examiners, unless "permission to reapply or petition earlier .. . is
granted by the committee at the time of such denial." Reapplication after a second denial
cannot be made earlier than one year after such denial. Id. Rule X, § 102.
159. Although "neither the hearsay rule nor any other technical rule of evidence necd
be observed," an applicant must be "advised of any and all information received by the
committee adversely bearing on his moral character," and must "be given a reasonable
opportunity to rebut or explain the same." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6068, Rule X,
§ 101 (as amended to May 17, 1968). Provisions are included for compulsory attendance of
witnesses and production of documents; and for the notification of an applicant at least
five days before his mandatory personal hearing. Id. Rule I, §§ 7-9. The applicant is given
the right to a de novo hearing before the full committee on the basis of new evidence.
Id. Rule X, § 101.8. The applicant also has the right to appeal to the full committee, and
ultimately to the Supreme Court. Id. Ride X, § 101.7.
By recent amendment the subcommittee is specifically required to transmit to the full
committee after each hearing "(i) a brief statement of the proceedings, (ii) the record of
the subcommittee's investigation, (iii) findings of fact and a brief statement of its con-
dusions based thereon, and (iv) the subcommittee's report." Id. Rule X, § 101.5. The
report as transmitted by the subcommittee constitutes a formal record of the admission
proceedings concerning moral character on which all subsequent appeals are based. Id.
Rule X, §§ 101.6-101.8.
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moral character.1, 0 Unlike many other jurisdictions, however, review
by the Supreme Court of an adverse determination by the Committee
of Bar Examiners is de novo since the court exercises original rather
than appellate jurisdiction.''
B. Statutory Admission Standard
The statutory admission requirement in California states merely that
the applicant "[b]e of good moral character."'1 2 The applicant may
establish prima facie proof of good moral character by submitting to
the examiners favorable character references from members of the bar
and bench.163 While there is case law holding that an inquiry into
moral fitness may be broader in scope for admission to the bar than
for disbarment, 64 the same cases define "good moral character" as an
absence of past conduct involving moral turpitude which would
constitute statutory grounds for disbarment. 13 As the California Su-
preme Court has recognized, therefore, the difference between the
admission and disbarment standard is "more apparent than real."ca
160. See generally In re Clark, 63 Cal. 2d 610, 612, 407 P.2d 993 (1965); Schullman v.
State Bar, 59 Cal. 2d 590, 599, 381 P.2d 658, 663 (1963); Rock v. State Bar. 57 Cal. 2d 639.
642, 371 P.2d 308, 310 (1962); Hatch v. State Bar, 55 Cal. 2d 127, 128, 357 P.2d 1064 (1961);
Sullivan v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 2d 491, 501, 326 P.2d 138, 144 (1958); Webb v. State Bar, 47
Cal. 2d 866, 868, 306 P.2d 458, 459 (1957); Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 291 P. 697
(1930). See also Farley, Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission to the Bar, 29
ST. B. oF CALF. J. 454 (1954).
161. See n. 156 supra. See also Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr.
228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966). It has been held that admission to the bar is an exercise of the
inherent powers of the Supreme Court in California. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal.
439, 443, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929). See also In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935);
In re Cate, 273 P. 617 (App. 1928).
162. CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(c) (West 1962).
163. See, e.g., In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 76, 98 P.2d 489, 491, (1940) (proftssional refer-
ences not prima fade proof of "good moral character, but entitled to a most respectful
consideration').
164. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232, 421 P.2d 76.
80 (1966); Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 188, 294 P. 697, 699 (1930); In re Wells.
174 Cal. 467, 474-75, 163 P. 657, 661 (1917). It was stated in Wells, for example,
and reaffirmed in Spears, that in a proceeding for admission, "[t]he court may
receive any evidence which tends to show [the applicant's) character for honesty, integ-
rity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might
not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment." 174 Cal.
467, 475 (1917).
165. In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657 (1917), and Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183,
294 P. 697 (1920), as well as other California cases approving denial of admission to the
bar, have been cited to demonstrate that "good moral character" has traditionally been
defined in California "in terms of an absence of proven conduct or acts which haie been
historically considered as manifestations of 'moral turpitude."' Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957); see also In re Myerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489, (1948).
166. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231, 421 P.2d 76, 81 (1966).
The following footnote appears in the Hallinan opinion as further documentation of
the "distinction without a difference" between the admission and disbarment standards
of moral character:
Moreover, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 242, 77 S. Ct. 752,
1 L. Ed. 2d 796, the United States Supreme Court appears to treat "moral turpi-
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What constitutes proof of moral turpitude in California? The
statutory language juxtaposes "moral turpitude" with "dishonesty or
corruption,"'16 7 thus suggesting an emphasis on fraud and insincerity
rather than on acts performed in good faith whether or not they are
intentional violations of the law.0 8 This interpretation is supported by
the preponderance of California case law.'00 Under the moral turpitude
standard, a felony conviction in California may be used to deny admis-
sion for lack of "good moral character" only where the conviction
alone indicates a probability of professional misconduct.1 0 As sug-
gested by the California Supreme Court, the question asked by the
Bar Examiners should always be, "does the petitioner's . . . felony
conviction bear a direct relationship to his fitness to practice law?" 1'
tude" as the relevant criterion in reviewing a decision to refuse admission, even
though the New Mexico statute, like our own statute, required a showing of good
moral character on the part of the applicant. And in Moura v. State Bar, 18 Cal.
2d 31, 32, 112 P.2d 629, this court used "good moral character" as the standard in
a disbarment case.
421 P.2d 76, 81 n.5 (1966).
167. CALiF. Bus & PROF. CODE § 6106 (West 1962). The statute also states that an
attorney's act involving moral turpitude constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension
"whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise,
and whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor or not . E." [ mphasis added.). Id. § 6106.
In these two minor but potentially significant ways, therefore, the statutory standard In
California is more difficult to meet than per se felony conviction statutes like those In
New York and Texas (see pp. 1391-94, 1400-01 infra).
168. Although an intent to commit physical violence against another person resulting
in a criminal conviction was held not to involve moral turpitude, Hlallinan v. Comm.
of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966), In re Rothrack, 16 Cal. 2d 449,
106 P.2d 907 (1940), fraudulent behavior not resulting in criminal conviction has
been held to fall within the moral turpitude standard: Hatch v. State Bar 9 Cal.
Rptr. 808, 357 P.2d 1064 (1961) (evidence that attorney commingled client's funds
with his own and converted same to his personal use without knowledge of client);
Honoroff v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 2d 202, 323 P.2d 1003 (1958) (keeping of proper books of
account, vouchers, receipts and checks had significant bearing on issue of attorney's
honesty and professional conduct when his acts are called into question); Noland v. State
Bar, 46 Cal. Rptr. 305, 405 P.2d 129 (1965) (prosecuting attorney advising unauthorized
removal of names from master jury lists).
169. The following behavior has been held to constitute sufficient grounds for dis-
barment, suspension, or denial of admission to the bar in California: Werner v. State
Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 611, 150 P.2d 892 (1944) (bribery); Bryant v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 285,
131 P.2d 523 (1942) (complicity in usurious transaction); Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.
2d 580, 122 P.2d 549 (1942) (misrepresentation); Bruns v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d 667, 117
P.2d 327 (1941) (taking money under false pretenses); Moura v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d 31,
112 P.2d 629 (1941) (misappropriation of client's funds); Suspension of Hickman, 18 Cal.
2d 71, 113 P.2d 1 (1941) (attempted grand theft); Stanford v. State Bar of Calif., 15 Cal.
2d 721, 104 P.2d 635 (1940) (misuse of trust funds); Barton v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 2d 294,
40 P.2d 502 (1935) (attempted extortion); Jacobs v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 59, 25 P.2d 401
(1933) (violation of fiduciary responsibility); Lantz v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 213, 298 P. 497
(1931) (violation of fiduciary responsibility); Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697
(forgery); In re Cruickshank, 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 P. 1098 (1928) (embezzlement).
170. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966).
See also pp. 1364-67 supra; Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupa.
tional Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. REv. 533, 541 (1962); Standard of Conduct for
Administrative License Revocation, 44 CALIF. L. Rxv. 403, 405 (1956).
171. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76, 93 (1966).
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The Supreme Court, in fact, has refined its moral turpitude test to
require that cases be decided on all the circumstances, no single act
or crime constituting conclusive evidence of bad moral character.172
Circumstances attendant upon the commission of the offense are
crucial: 173 assault with a deadly weapon does not require the disbar-
ment of an attorney when there was sufficient provocation to eliminate
the stigma of moral turpitude from his actions,1 74 but the manslaughter
conviction of a driver who was not licensed because of poor vision is
grounds for his disbarment since he was morally remiss to drive with-
out a license. 75 A summary of the California standard-an excellent
model for jurisdictions with less sophisticated methods of judging the
moral character of a bar admission candidate-is found in Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners:
There is certain conduct involving fraud, perjury, theft, embez-
zlement and bribery where there is no question but that moral
turpitude is involved. On the other hand, because the law does
not always coincide exactly with the principles of morality, there
are cases that are crimes that would not necessarily involve moral
turpitude. 76
As already noted, California case law strongly suggests that under this
standard the crime of refusal of induction is not one involving moral
turpitude and so does not justify denial of admission.177 The only case
indicating an opposite result is In re O'Connell,78 a World War I dis-
barment suit which was decided before the adoption of a functional
172. "There is necessarily a field of doubtful cases where the determination as to
whether moral turpitude was involved may fall on one or the other side of the line, de-
pending upon the circumstances of the particular case." In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d
147, 150, 73 P.2d 885, 886 (1937). See also Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements
for Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L REV. 533, 543 (1962); Standard of Con-
duct for Administrative License Revocation, 44 CALw. L. REv. 403, 406 (1956).
173. Engaging in fights resulting in assault convictions, for example, will not be re-
garded as involving moral turpitude unless it demonstrates "baseness, vileness and de-
pravity." Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 239, 421 P.2d 76, 93
(1966). "Youth and inexperience" have been held to constitute mitigating circumstances for
judging conduct which would normally involve moral turpitude. Dudney v. State Bar, 214
Cal. 238, 240, 4 P.2d 770, 771 (1931).
174. In re Rothrack, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940).
175. In re Alkow, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800 (1966).
176. 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76, 85 (1966), citing Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 24,
138 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1956).
177. In Otsula v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 599, 614 P.2d 412, 414 (1966), cited by the
Hallinan court as one of the bases for its conclusion, a petitioner who had been denied
conscientious objector status and later refused induction was held not to have committed
a felony threatening "the integrity of the electoral process," and therefore was entitled
to vote according to the functional approach to draft law convictions. See pp. 1380-81
supra.
178. 182 Cal. 786, 194 P. 1010 (1920).
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approach to felony convictions by the California Supreme Court.
Furthermore, O'Connell was convicted and disbarred for conspiracy
to violate the Espionage Act of 1917, which made it unlawful to ob-
struct recruiting in time of war.179
Even where a functional approach to the felonious behavior of a bar
applicant creates a presumption of character deficiency sufficient to
prevent his admission, the presumption can be overcome in California,
unlike many other states,8 0 by evidence that the applicant has been
rehabilitated since the time he committed his felony.' The impor-
tance of rehabilitation as a means of eliminating civil disabilities is
underscored by the California Penal Code, which provides that con-
victed persons who have "fulfilled the conditions of [their] probation
... shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities re-
sulting from the offense or crime of which [they have] been con-
victed."'1 2
II. District of Columbia
A. Admission Procedure
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is
authorized by statute to "make such rules as it deems proper respecting
examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in
its bar, their censure, suspension, and expulsion."'8 3 Although it too
179. The only other reported attempt by a Selective Service felon to gain admission
to the California bar is mentioned in a brief, in Application of Brooks, Peti-
tioner's Brief for Certiorari at 22, 365 U.S. 813 (1961). This was an administrative
proceeding which never reached the Supreme Court because the Bar Examiners certified
the applicant's moral character and admitted him to the bar despite his Induction
refusal.
180. See, e.g., District of Columbia, pp. 1390-91 infra; Texas, p. 1401 infra.
181. Letters from members of the bar and others who have known and worked with
an applicant attesting to his sincerity and good behavior since the commission of his
offense have been held to rebut a presumption against his good moral character. See
March v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 63 Cal. Rptr. 399, 408, 433 P.2d 191, 200 (1967):
[Elven on the assumption that [the petitioner's] ... conduct constituted moral turpl.
tude, it appears from a careful reading of the petitioner's testimony before the bar
examiners that he has convincingly demonstrated his rehabilitation and that he is
morally qualified to become a member of the bar.
Proof that rehabilitated behavior is not "a matter of expediency under pressure," how-
ever, can be difficult to establish. Bernstein v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 70 Cal. Rptr.
106, 443 P.2d 570 (1968) (restitution of money wrongfully retained regarded by court
as motivated by fear of prosecution and thus not sufficient evidence to establish rehabll-
itation). The case law holds that rehabilitation is a "state of mind" rather than any
specific behavior. See, e.g., In re Gaffney, 28 Cal. 2d 761, 764, 171 P.2d 873, 874-75 (1946).
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1955).
183. 5 D.C. CODE ENCYcL. ANN. § 11-2101 (West 1966). See also Lark v. West, 182
F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865 (1961); Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 1947).
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stands at the head of the admission process, the District Court has not
acted with the same specificity as the California court in controlling
admission procedures. With regard to character examinations the court
merely requires that "an exhaustive examination... be made either by
the Committee [on Admissions and Grievances'6 4] or by an appropriate
agency as to [an applicant's] .. .character and a favorable report be
made thereon."'185 The court rules prescribe no particular procedures
for conducting character hearings, 80 although there is some case law
which sets up minimal standards of fair investigation.
187
Since there are few formalities in a character hearing and since the
delegation of fact-finding responsibilities to the Committee eliminates
all characteristics of a judicial proceeding from the Committee's deter-
mination,188 the court cannot entertain a direct appeal by a rejected
applicant.189 To offset the apparent failure of the statute and court
rules to provide a remedy for the applicant who has received prejudi-
cial treatment at the hands of the Committee, the Court of Appeals
has sanctioned an ornate and circuitous substitute for judicial review.
A rejected applicant must begin a civil action against the Committee
alleging abuse of discretion. Such a complaint will be entitled to a
judicial hearing and will give the complainant a right to further ap-
peal.190 The practical effect of this procedure is to afford the aggrieved
applicant a de novo judicial hearing not unlike the simpler California
arrangement.' 9'
B. Moral Turpitude Standard
A moral turpitude standard for assessing the functional relevance of
criminal convictions to the practice of law in the District of Columbia
is prescribed by statute for disbarment only.192 However the California
184. 9 D.C. CODE ENCYCI. ANN. U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules, D.C., Rule 93(a) (West 1967). as
amended, (Supp. 1968).
185. Id. Rule 93(g).
186. Rule 93(g) merely requires that "an exhaustive examination" be conducted by
the Committee.
187. See, eg., In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1951). (procedural due process right
to a hearing). See generally Willner v. Comm. on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (procedural
due process right to hearing and information about grounds for denial of certification in
bar admission proceedings).
188. In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Brooks v. Laws, 203 F.2d 18
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Carver v. Clephane 137 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
189. In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (nothing in the application requires an
entry in a court docket, open taking and recording of eidence, or judidal judgment or
order, and thus nothing is appealable).
190. See In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp.
103 (D.D.C. 1947); Carver v. Clephane, 137 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
191. See pp. 1384-85 supra.
192. 5 D.C. CODE ENoycr ANN. § 11-2103 (West 1966). The statute is slightly more
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rule is that "good moral character"'10 is best demonstrated in an admis-
sion proceeding by showing an absence of past conduct involving moral
turpitude would also seem to apply in the District because the statutes
are similar and because there are no District of Columbia cases up-
holding the denial of admission to applicants convicted of crimes not
involving moral turpitude. 1 94
The essence of moral turpitude, as it reflects on the practice of law,
is fraudulent behavior which might poison the relationship between
an attorney and his client or the court. An attorney's forgery convic-
tion, for example, was ground for his disbarment because it "de-
stroy[ed] the bond of confidence which must exist between a court and
[a lawyer]."'' 9 r It is doubtful that conviction for refusal of induction
would alone constitute sufficient cause for a denial of admission under
this standard. Unlike California, however, the District has no recorded
professional licensing cases involving draft law felons. 00
In applying its moral turpitude standard the District differs from
California in one highly significant way: felonies committed by attor-
neys or prospective attorneys are generally considered in terms of
criminal categories rather than individual behavior, and it is hard to
imagine extenuating circumstances which might make the Committee
on Admissions and Grievances overlook a conviction categorized as
involving moral turpitude. When a member of the bar, for example,
was convicted of embezzling funds entrusted to him as a fiduciary, his
emphatic about the effect of a felony conviction than that of California, and reads as
follows:
When a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a duly certified
copy of the final judgment of the conviction is presented to the court, the name of
the member so convicted may thereupon, by order of the court, be struck from the
roll of the members of the bar, and he shall thereafter cease to be a member thereof.
Upon appeal from a judgment of conviction, and pending the final determination
of the appeal, the court may order the suspension from practice of the convicted
member of the bar; and upon reversal of the conviction, or the granting of a pardon,
the court may vacate or modify the order ....
193. Neither the District of Columbia statute nor the District Court Rules use the
phrase "good moral character," although the Rules require a "favorable report" by the
Committee on Admissions and Grievances on an applicant's character. U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules,
D.C., Rule 93(g), supra note 184. "Good moral character," however, is cited In case law as
the standard an applicant must meet before the Committee. See, e.g., Carver v. Clephane,
137 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Cf., Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 4 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1925), af'd, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
194. Whether such denials might have occurred in unrecorded administrative pro-
ceedings, however, is unknown.
195. In re Williams, 158 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.D.C. 1957), aflJd, 256 F.2d 888(D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Lark v. West, 182 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1960) (conviction for
mail fraud held to destroy relationship of lawyer to client and court).
196. There has, however, been at least one induction refuser who was admitted to the
District Bar in an unrecorded administrative proceeding. See Application of Brooks,
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 22, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
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Under the New York Judiciary Law the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in each judicial district is empowered to certify that an
applicant who has passed the New York State Bar Examination "pos-
sesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and
counsellor-at-law."' 98 Each appellate division is authorized to appoint
a separate committee on character and fitness to investigate applicants
who reside in the division's judicial district.19 While a committee may
make a preliminary determination of the applicant's moral character,
neither its standards nor its substantive findings are binding on the
appellate division, which on appeal may conduct a de novo character
investigation.2 0 Furthermore, review of a committee ruling by an
appellate division may go to the whole record of the proceedings, since
it is within the discretion of the justices "to permit to be divulged all
or any part of such papers, records and documents" as shall have been
compiled concerning the applicant.201
B. Per Se Rule for New York Felony Convictions
Although there is no statutory provision in New York concerning
the effect of a felony conviction in determining "character and general
fitness"2 02 for bar admission, such a conviction regardless of moral
turpitude is a ground for summary disbarment under the New York
Judiciary Law.203 Felonious behavior in New York, however, is re-
197. In re Quimby, 359 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In another recent casc upholding
a disbarment order in a similar fact situation, a concurring opinion written by Circuit
Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger -warned that a crcumstantial approach to felonies
committed by members of the bar would "give the public grave cause for concern and
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the profession and of the legal system
w%-hose functioning depends upon lawvyers." In re Ewvers, 379 F.2d 474, 476&77 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Such arguments raise the spectre of the "reputation of the bar" character standard.
discussed at length above and rejected as unconstitutionally vague and violative of
first amendment freedoms. See pp. 1358-63 supra.
198. N.Y. JuDiciARY LAw § 90.1.b (McKinney 1968). See generally Note, 20 FonRtn,
L. REv. 305 (1951).
199. N.Y. JunlcrARY LAw §§ 90.1.a, 90.1.c (McKinney 1968).
200. See Application of Weiss, 24 App. Div. 2d 981, 265 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1965); Applica.
tion of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), afJ'd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d
41 (1947).
201. N.Y. JuDiCLARY LAw § 90.10 (McKinney 1968).
202. Id. § 90.1.a.
203. Id. § 90.4. The New York statute is similar to that of die District of Columbia
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garded as perhaps even stronger evidence of disability in admission
than in disbarment proceedings, as demonstrated by the rule that a
bar applicant's acquittal in a criminal action is not res judicata upon
the issue to be determined by a character committee.204
New York and jurisdictions with similar per se statutory rules on
convicted felons therefore would appear to offer the most difficult
possible hurdle for draft law felons seeking admission to the bar. This
assessment is unwarranted, however, because the narrow statutory con-
struction which the courts in New York have applied to the per se rule
makes the New York statute considerably less forbidding to the con-
victed felon than an independent and substantially unreviewable
character and fitness committee in a state like Connecticut or IllinoisY 05
The narrow reading of the per se rule which prevails in the New York
courts interprets "felony convictions" to embrace "only those Federal
felonies which are also felonies under the laws of [New York] State,"
and to exclude "such Federal felonies as are 'cognizable by [New York]
laws as a misdemeanor or not at all.' "206 Federal felonies which have
been held not to constitute grounds for summary disbarment, how-
ever, are limited generally to conspiratorial offenses specifically defined
by statute as misdemeanors in New York.20 7
in all respects except for its highly significant lack of a moral turpitude provision:
Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who shall be convicted of a
felony, shall, upon conviction, cease to be an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to
be competent to practice law as such.
Whenever any attorney and counsellor-at-law shall be convicted of a felony, there
may be presented to the appellate division of the supreme court a certified or excmp-
lified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and thereupon the name of the person
so convicted shall, by order of the court, be struck from the roll of attorneys. Id.
204. Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1914), afl'd,
296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947) (acquittal in criminal action not deemed res
judicata with regard to character investigation, since conduct not descending to level of
criminal guilt may still present insuperable obstacles to bar admission if conduct evi-
dences lack of requisite character for practice of law). Admission and disbarment stan-
dards are quite similar, however, since acquittal does not necessarily require reinstate-
ment of an attorney after his disbarment. In re Griffin, 249 App. Div. 381, 292 N.Y.S.
833 (1937); In re Stein, 249 App. Div. 382, 292 N.Y.S. 828 (1937); In re Marko, 23 App.
Div. 2d 442, 261 N.Y.S. 2d 302 (1965); In re Ginsberg, I N.Y. 2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193 (1956).
205. See pp. 1395-96, 1398-99 infra.
206. In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 292, 26 N.E2d 260, 263 (1940).
207. In In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E2d 260 (1940), an attorney who had becin
convicted of the federal felony of conspiring to commit mail fraud was not disbarred
because "[u]nder the law of New York . . . conspiracy to commit a crime is only a rn-
demeanor." Id. at 287, 26 N.E.2d at 261. The Court of Appeals has sometimes refused to
rule whether a non-conspiratorial federal felony which is only a misdemeanor under
New York law is cognizable within the terms of N.Y. JuDIcIARY LAW § 90.4 (McKlnney
1968), since primary jurisdiction for such a ruling is reserved by that statute to the
Appellate Division. See In re Kaufman, 245 N.Y. 423, 157 N.E. 730 (1927); In re Lind-
heim, 213 App. Div. 560, 211 N.Y.S. 261 (1925). In other cases, however, the court has
been able to rule that federal felonies do fall under § 90.4. See In re I-less, 250 App.
Div. 581, 295 N.Y.S. 82 (1937); In re Wilhoit, 220 App. Div. 132, 221 N.Y.S. 924 (1927);
In re Boetzel, 191 App. Div. 881, 180 N.Y.S. 412 (1920).
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The vital question with respect to Selective Service felonies in New
York, therefore, is whether they, like conspiratorial offenses, fall out-
side the purview of the per se felony conviction rule. In re Green-
berger,-0o the only case directly on point, seems to disregard the estab-
lished New York rule requiring that federal felonies be classified by
the courts as involving moral turpitude before the statutory exclusion
can be applied. The case involved a defendant in a disbarment pro-
ceeding who had pleaded guilty to the federal charge of refusing induc-
tion.20 9 He made no appearance to contest the proceeding and did not
appeal his disbarment. The court stated tersely: "Said crime is a felony.
Pursuant to ... the Judiciary Law, therefore, he should be dis-
barred."210 But in a subsequent proceeding, Greenberger was rein-
stated,211 presumably either because he had received a presidential
pardon or because he should not have been disbarred in de first place.
Despite Greenberger, however, the New York courts have often ap-
plied a moral turpitude standard to determine whether a federal crime
not expressly defined as a felony under New York law should require
summary disbarment. The Judiciary Law states that an attorney "who
is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime
or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice" may be censured, suspended or disbarred.2 12 The courts have
construed this statutory language to mean that conduct which is not
felonious under New York law must involve moral turpitude before
it can justify disbarment. For example, an attorney who was convicted
in a federal court of the felony of transporting stolen goods in inter-
state commerce was disbarred not for the bare fact of his conviction
but because his crime involved moral turpitude.21 3 In another dis-
barment case, concerning a federal felony conviction for conspiracy to
defraud, the Appellate Division asserted that
208. 265 App. Div. 343, 88 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1942).
209. Since the decision is per curiam with no written opinion, it is unknov,'n whether
Greenberger's refusal was based on conscientious objection.
210. 265 App. Div. 343, 38 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1942). See also In re Scanlon, 12 App. Div. 2d
21, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (1960); In re Sobel, 258 App. Div. 465, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1940); In re
Hodgskin, 193 App. Div. 217, 183 N.Y.S. 401 (1920); cases cited note 207 supra.
211. In re Greenberger, 278 App. Div. 925, 105 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1951).
212. N.Y. JutniciAY LAw § 90.2 (McKinney 1968). See, e.g., In re Sheiman, 277 App.
Div. 89, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (1950) (disbarment ordered upon evidence that attorney plea ed
guilty to charge of bribing an officer of the Treasury Department of the United Statei);
In re Hiss, 276 App. Div. 701, 96 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1950) (disbarment of attorney for know-
ingly and wilfully making false statements before a Grand Jury of the United States
under oath); In re Greenberg, 19 App. Div. 2d 375, 243 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1963) (disbarment
of attorney who submitted false statements to insurance carriers as to loss of earnings
and injuries of clients); In re Portnick, 5 App. Div. 2d 16, 169 N.YS.2d 178 (1957)
(disbarment of attorney for issuing fraudulent checks).
218. In re Turley, 268 App. Div. 706, 53 N.YS.2d 46 (1945).
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the respondent may of course offer any available proof which
might affect.., the weight to be accorded... [the conviction] ...
[to] explain his participation or involvement in the crime charged;
and which might serve to repel or negative any inference as to his
moral turpitude by reason of the conviction. 214
The crime of induction refusal offers abundant opportunity to rebut
an inference of moral turpitude. This was demonstrated by Matter of
Koster v. Holz, 215 in which a Selective Service felon was held to have
been improperly denied an insurance broker's license on the ground
that his induction refusal might have been based on conscientious and
sincere opposition to war and thus could not be presumed to constitute
evidence of "untrustworthiness." 210
IV. Connecticut
A. Admission Procedure
The Superior Court is the head of the admissions structure in Con-
necticut 217 and its rules with regard to admission procedure have the
force of statute.2 18 The court has delegated virtually all investigatory
214. In re Keogh, 25 App. Div. 2d 499, 500, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 87, 89 (1966), modified on
other grounds sub noma. Keogh v. Richardson, 17 N.Y.2d 479, 214 N.E.2d 163 (1966).
See also In re Darmstadt, 35 App. Div. 285, 55 N.Y.S. 22 (1898) (attorney may show that
crime did not involve moral turpitude, or that extenuating circumstances did not make
criminal conviction sufficient cause for disbarment). But see In re Patrick, 186 App. Dlv.
450, 120 N.Y.S. 1006 (1910) (court cannot inquire into alleged procedural irregularity of
conviction as an "extenuating circumstance" sufficient to mitigate the seriousness of the
crime as it reflects on practice of law). See also Barash v. Ass'n of Bar of City of N.Y.,
20 N.Y.2d 154, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 228 N.E.2d 896 (1967) (dictum) (lawyer's felony convic-
tion is ipso facto grounds for his disbarment); In re Jonas, 26 App. Dlv. 2d 87, 270 N.YS.2d
1021 (1966) (upon conviction of felony defendant automatically ceased to be an attorney).
215. 3 N.Y.2d 639, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65, 148 N.E.2d 287 (1958).
216. 3 N.Y.2d at 648, 171 N.Y..2d at 72, 148 N.E2d at 294 (1958). See p. 1374 supra.
In Koster the New York court reasoned that "[i]f it is determined upon evidence that the
Selective Service Board believed the petitioner to be a sincere person, but one whose
beliefs did not entitle him to conscientious objector status . . . . then the denial of his
application for a license where this is the only evidence of untrustworthiness would be
arbitrary and capricious." 3 N.Y.2d at 648, 171 N.YS.2d at 72. See Schwartz, Administra-
tive Law, 33 N.Y.U. L. REy. 1090, 1091 (1958); McKay, Constitutional Law, 34 N.Y.U. L.
Rv. 1359, 1372-73 (1959). See also Application of Steinbugler, 297 N.Y. 713, 77 N.E.2d 16
(1947) (claim of exemption from military service on conscientious grounds, absent proof of
disloyalty or insincerity, held not sufficient to justify exclusion from the bar).
The Illinois courts have grossly misinterpreted the meaning of such a judicial inquiry
into the circumstances of a criminal conviction in order to determine its relevance to the
practice of law. See p. 1399 infra.
Since at least one draft law felon has been admitted to the New York bar in an un-
recorded administrative proceeding, the foregoing analysis of the New York per se felony
conviction rule is more than purely speculative. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
22, Application of Brooks, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
217. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-80 (West 1960).
218. Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 241, 43 A.2d 224, 226 (1945). See also State
Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (held that
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authority concerning moral character to the various county bar associa-
don examining committees.219 This delegation is important since there
is no Connecticut statute to define the relevance of felony convictions
in a determination of moral character. 20 The only guidelines for
the county committees are regulations concerning admission qualifi-
cations "as to pre-law education, legal education, morals and fitness"
propounded by a state Bar Examining Committee set up under the
Superior Court rules.221 The courts, however, have recently begun to
establish procedural controls over the county committee investiga-
tions.2 22
The effect of the Superior Court's broad delegation of investigatory
powers to the local examining committees is to reduce sharply the
scope of judicial review of character rulings. An aggrieved applicant's
appeal rights are limited to matters of law,2 23 of which there are few
since "[p]roceedings for admission to the bar are not actions or suits at
law,"224 and since there are no statutory character standards binding
on the investigatory committees. The refusal of an examining commit-
tee to apply a moral turpitude standard to a convicted applicant, for
no statute can control judicial department in performance of its duty to decide who
shall have privilege of practicing law); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Comm., 116Conn. 409, 165 A. 211 (1933) (admission of attorneys to bar held to be exclusive judicialfunction); Mrotek v. Nair, 4 Conn. Cir. 313, 231 A.2d 95 (1967) (rules of superior courtjudges regarding bar admission have effect of statute).
219. CONN. PRAcTiCE Boor, Rules for the Superior Court § 4 (West 1966).220. Unlike, e.g., California (see pp. 1385-86 supra), District of Columbia (see pp. 1389-90 supra), New York (see p. 1391 supra), and Texas (see p. 1400 infra).
221. CoNN. PRACncE BooK, Rules for the Superior Court § 6 (Vest 1966). Such regula-
tions are concerned with educational standards, but not generally with character and
fitness standards.
222. See, e.g., Application of Dinan, 244 A.2d 608 (Conn. 1968), holding that wheredemanl of application for admission to the bar depends on information supplied by a per-
son whose reliability or veracity is brought into question by the applicant, procedural dueprocess rights of confrontation and cross-examination must be afforded the applicant. This
case overruled a contrary holding in O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777 (1906). See
also Willner v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 373 US. 96 (1963).
223. Application of Plantamura, 22 Conn. Supp. 213, 165 A.2d 859 (1961), aff'd, 149Conn. 111, 176 A.2d 61 (1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 872 (1962) (review of committeedenial of admission of foreign attorney on grounds that he had not met requirement ofConn. Practice Book § 8 that he have practiced at least 5 years in highest court of an-
other state). See also Application of Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 178 A.2d 528 (1962) (nohearing de novo on factual determinations within discretion of bar committees); Higgins
v. Hartford Co. Bar, 111 Conn. 47, 149 A. 415 (1930) (only matter for review upon com-
mittee's denial of application by candidate to take bar exam was whether committee
acted fairly); In re Vestcott, 66 Conn. 585, 34 A. 505 (1896) (appeal from disbarmentproceeding is extremely limited since nature of bar committee order is so dicretionary
that court will only interfere in a "plain case').But see Application of Hunt, 155 Conn. 186. 230 A.2d 432 (1967) (when no fact dispute
exists as to applicant's compliance with the conditions of admission, whether compliance
has occurred is a reviewable question of law).
224. Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961).
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example, would probably not raise a question of law since no such
standard is binding on the committee. 225 The leading interpretation of
committee discretionary powers under the court rules220 suggests that
a Connecticut court will
inquire whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair
investigation of the facts .... This principle applies to cases such
as the present, where the issue involves an exercise of the commit-
tee's discretion. It does not apply to cases involving specific re-
quirements of the rules as to such things as age, residence, or
graduation from an approved school-requirements over which
the committee has no discretion.
227
B. Ambiguous Felony Conviction Standard
The wide discretion exercised by the examining committees and the
absence of a statutory moral turpitude standard combine to make it
very difficult to ascertain Connecticut judicial policy regarding con-
victed felons who seek admission to the bar.228 The only reported Con-
necticut case in which the effect of a criminal conviction was at issue
involved disbarment rather than admission. In Grievance Committee
of Hartford County Bar v. Broder,229 an attorney's conviction for the
crime of adultery was regarded by the court as an infamous crime in-
volving moral turpitude, and thus indicative of moral unfitness for the
profession. The decision implies that a functional approach is not
used in Connecticut to determine the effect of criminal convictions,3 0
since it does not distinguish other less "infamous" types of criminal
behavior from adultery. A recent disbarment case cites a currently
225. It would be possible to argue that the "law-fact" distinction is meaningless on
the grounds that the Connecticut statutory requirements with regard to legal education,
age, and other matters considered by the case law to be matters of "law" are specified In
no greater detail than the statutory requirements with regard to character, generally con-
sidered by the courts to be matters of "fact."
226. CONN. PacricE BooK, Rules for the Superior Court § 12 (West 1966).
227. Application of Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 273, 178 A.2d 528, 533 (1962). See also
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (federal constitutional requirement
that the denial of bar admission by bar examining committee "have rational support In
evidence").
228. There are judicial pronouncements, on the one hand, stating that higher moral
standards are required for admission to the bar than for defense against disbarment,
O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777 (1906) (dicta), and on the other hand, that
morally deficient conduct which would keep applicants from becoming members of the
bar also constitutes ground for disbarment, In re Horwitz, 21 Conn. Supp. 363, 154 A2d
879 (1959).
229. 112 Conn. 269, 152 A.2d 292 (1930).
230. A functional approach is used in Connecticut in determining the relevance of
non-criminal behavior to the moral fitness of a bar candidate. "The ultimate purpose of
all regulations of the admission of attorneys is to assure the courts the assistance of
advocates of ability, learning and sound character and to protect the public from incom-
petent and dishonest practitioners." Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Comm., 116 Conn.
409, 415, 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).
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controlling "standard of honor and honesty... [with] such an apprecia-
tion of the distinctions between right and wrong in the conduct of men
toward each other as will make [the lawyer] a fit and safe person to
engage in the practice of law."231 It is unclear whether such a standard
would be used to distinguish a Selective Service felon from an adul-
terer, and whether the standard would be applied in the arguably more
rigorous2 32 admission process as well as in disbarment.
V. Illinois
A. Admission Procedure
Character investigation procedures in Illinois are established by
Supreme Court rule233 and administered by character and fitness com-
mittees appointed by the Supreme Court in each of the state's judicial
districts.23 4 Prior to a Supreme Court amendment in 1937,23 Illinois
procedures were extremely simple. The applicant merely submitted an
affidavit
concerning his history and environments, together with affidavits
of at least three respectable persons personally acquainted with
him residing in the county in which the applicant resides, each
testifying that the applicant is known to the affiant to be of good
moral character and general fitness to practice law, setting forth in
detail the facts upon which such knowledge is based.230
In 1937, however, the importance of these affidavits as prima facie
evidence of an applicant's good moral character was reduced by the
Supreme Court's authorization of the county committees to conduct
independent investigations, subpoena witnesses and hold hearings as
Commissioners of the Court.2T The consequent inflation of the com-
231. Application of Koenig, 152 Conn. 125, 132, 204 A.2d 88, 86 (1964). See generally
Note, 70 YALE L.J. 288 (1960).
232. See, e.g., O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777 (1906).
233. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A §§ 701, 708, 709 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
The Supreme Court bar admission rules have the force of statute in Illinois. People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 IlL 346, 8 N.E2d 941 (1937), cert. denied, 202
U.S. 728 (1937), reh. denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937).
234. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A § 708(a) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
235. Jenner and Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. at 578 (Smith-
Hurd 1956).
256. Id.
237. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l1OA § 709 (Smith-Hurd 1968). This intensified scrutiny of ap-
plicants by the examining committees, however, does not appear to have produced an
extraordinary number of denials of admission, at least during the first decade of Rule
709's operation. From 1938 to 1948 there were only eight admission denials on character
grounds out of a total of 3,805 bar applicants. Sprecher, Admission to Practice Law, 46
W_. Rav. 811, 834 (1952).
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mittees' investigative powers has not produced a corresponding growth
of procedural rights for admission applicants, who are guaranteed only
the minimal procedural protection afforded by federal constitutional
doctrine. 28
Judicial review of admission denials is authorized by a Supreme
Court rule,23 9 thus making Illinois slightly more attractive procedurally
to bar applicants with controversial character backgrounds than states
like Connecticut. 240 Nevertheless, an applicant has no right to a de
novo judicial hearing of his claim, and will only be granted review on
grounds that "the committee abused its discretion and that certain of
his constitutional rights were infringed upon."24'
B. Moral Turpitude
The moral turpitude standard is a judicial creature in Illinois and
there is no statutory provision concerning the effect of a felony con-
viction on either disbarment or admission proceedings. 242 Since the
courts generally entertain appeals by aggrieved admission applicants
only when constitutional questions are at issue,243 there have been only
two reported decisions about the bearing of a felony conviction on the
requisite moral character of an admission candidate. The existence of
a pardon rather than the absence of moral turpitude was dispositive in
both cases. 244 A disbarment action against an attorney who had been
238. See Willner v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
239. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A § 708(d) (Smith-Hurd 1968) states:
An applicant who has availed himself of his full hearing rights before the Committee
on Character and Fitness and who deems himself aggrieved by the determination of
the committee may, on notice to the committee, petition the Supreme Court for relief.
240. See pp. 1394-96 supra.
241. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 474, 121 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 946 (1955). See also In re Frank, 293 Ill. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920); In re Latiner, 11
Ill. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 82 (1957).
242. The standard is prescribed neither by ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 13 § 1 (Smith-Hurd
1963) (the general licensing statute for attorneys and counsellors), nor by mt,. ANN. STAT.
ch. IlOA §§ 708, 751 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (provisions governing character investigation and
disbarment proceedings).
243. The three leading Illinois admission cases raising substantive questions about tile
moral character standard all concern problems created by the loyalty oath requirements
of the Illinois Constitution and the State Bar Committee on Character and Fitness. In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), reh. denied, 326 US. 807; In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d
471. 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 348 US. 946 (1955); In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327,
143 N.E.2d 20 (1957).
244. People ex rel. Deneen v. Coleman, 210 Ill. 79, 71 N.E. 20 (1904) (attorney con-
victed of conspiracy to obtain money from insurance company by fraudulent means,
pardoned without serving sentence; thirteen years later applied for bar admission;
admitted on recommendation of attorney conversant with conviction and on evidence of
complete rehabilitation); People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 570, 73 N.E. 737
(1905) (attorney's conviction without pardon or evidence of rehabilitation suffident to bar
him from practice of law).
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convicted of tax evasion provides a typical example of how the Su-
preme Court treats the moral turpitude issue when felonious behavior
is involved:
Without attempting to limit the meaning of the phrase, we think
it elementary that fraud or fraudulent conduct on the part of an
attorney resulting in his conviction necessarily carries the con-
notation of moral turpitude.24a
It is unclear whether Illinois would apply a functional test to the
determination of moral turpitude in the case of draft refusal. The only
Illinois case which directly concerns the effect of a draft law conviction
in bar admission or disciplinary proceedings was based on a clear mis-
understanding of the issue.2 40 It was held in In re Pontarelli2 47 that the
refusal of induction by a Selective Service registrant who had unsuc-
cessfully sought conscientious objector status was a crime involving
moral turpitude. The court justified its conclusion on the ground that
it had no jurisdiction to review such a criminal conviction.2 48 As sug-
gested above,249 however, the court in reviewing the applicant's "gen-
eral fitness to practice law" had not been asked to review the admittedly
valid conviction, but rather to determine the sincerity of the applicant's
conscientious objection.250
245. In re Teitelbaum, 13 IM. 2d 586, 589, 150 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1958) (emphasis added).
See also In re Sullivan, 33 MI1. 2d 548, 213 N.E.2d 257 (1965) (filing fraudulent income tax
return); In re Crane, 23 IMl. 2d 398, 178 N.E.2d 349 (1961) (income tax evasion); In re
Eaton, 14 111. 2d 338, 152 N.E.2d 850 (1958) (mail fraud); In re Needham, 364 M1. 65, 4
N.E.2d 19 (1936) (obtaining money through false pretenses).
246. See note 96 supra.
247. 393 IMl. 310, 66 N.E2d 83 (1946).
248. Id. at 313, 66 N.E2d at 84.
249. See pp. 1374, 1394 supra. The New York court in Kostcr managed to escape the
'relitigation fallacy' in a fact situation similar to the one in Pontarelli by correctly recog-
nizing that the petitioner's induction refusal might have been based on conscientious and
sincere opposition to war and thus could not be presumed to constitute evidence of
dishonesty.
250. This 'relitigation fallacy' is a variation of the tendency in the District of Columbia
courts to preclude any ad hoc consideration of a felony conviction on the basis of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. See pp. 1390-91 supra. The Illinois
Supreme Court asserted in In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill. 2d 586, 590, 150 N.E2d 873, 876
(1958), for example, that "we cannot go behind" the record of conviction. See also In re
Sullivan, 33 MII. 2d 548, 213 N.E.2d 257 (1965). In re Needham, 364 11M. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19
(1936).
The Illinois courts are not alone, however, in their misconception of the functional
approach: a similarly misleading discussion of Pontarelli in the context of "relitigating
the conviction" may be found in an otherwise admirable sketch of the effect of Selective
Service felony convictions on admission to the bar, written by members of a Harvard Law
School draft study project. Beil and Cohen, The Committee for Legal Research on the
Draft, Effect of Selective Service Felony Conviction on Admission to the Bar 6 (April 15,
1968).
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VI. Texas
A. Admission Procedure
The Texas Board of Law Examiners is empowered by statute to con-
duct all admission proceedings, including investigations of applicants
to determine whether they are "of such moral character . . . that it
would be proper for [them] ... to be licensed."1251 The Board is com-
prised of five lawyers who are appointed biennially by the Supreme
Court.252 Bar admissions in Texas, therefore, are accomplished directly
through the court of highest jurisdiction under the guidance of its ad-
ministrative arm: the court's statutory authority "shall not be dele-
gated" 253 and all admission standards are fashioned by the court it-
self.254 Although a bar admission candidate is nowhere specifically
accorded any procedural rights in his character examination, a disbar-
ment proceeding255 in Texas is conducted as a civil controversy in
which the general rules of civil procedure apply. 250 There is no right
of appeal following a character hearing, since the hearing is carried
out in an administrative wing of the state court of last resort.
B. Per Se Rule Denying Admission and Requiring Disbarment of All
Convicted Felons
The Texas statute excluding felons from the practice of law is
broader than that of any other jurisdiction: 2 7
No person convicted of any felony shall receive a license as an at-
torney at law; or, if licensed, any court of record in which such a
person may practice shall, on proof of a conviction of any felony,
revoke his license and strike his name from the roll of attorneys.258
What few chinks can be detected in this statutory armor are limited
to the disbarment side of the prohibition. There is some authority, for
example, to support the proposition that disbarment for certain feloni-
251. TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, art. 305 (Vernon 1959).
252. Id. art. 304.
253. Id. art. 303.6.
254. Id. art. 306.
255. Disbarment proceedings are conducted in "the district court of the county in
which the attorney resides or where the act complained of occurred . . . ." Id. art. 313.
256. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 76 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds,
103 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Com. App. 1937); Houtchens v. State, 63 S.W.2d 1011 (crex. Coin.
App. 1933), motion granted, 74 S.W.2d 976 (rex. Com. App. 1934); Houtchens v. Mercer,
119 Tex. 431, 29 S.W.2d 1031 (1930); Scott v. State, 86 Tex. 321, 24 S.W. 789 (1894).
257. Compare similar statutes with per se rules in Alabama (APPENDIx), Oklahoma(APPENDIX), New York (pp. 1391-94 supra), and Utah (APPENDIX).
258. TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, art. 311 (Vernon 1959).
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ous behavior259 is compulsory within the terms of the statute only when
an attorney commits a felony in his professional capacity, but not when
he is acting as a "private" person.20 Furthermore, felony convictions
obtained outside of Texas are at least arguably excepted from the ex-
clusionary rule,261 while a general exception to the rule has been made
for felons who have received unconditional pardons for their convic-
tions.2
62
259. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668, 674 (1858) (no attorney to be removed for
contempt conviction unless contempt involved professional conduct). See also Tax. Civ.
STAT. ANN. it. 14, art. 312 (Vernon 1959). i . . ....
260. Cf. So. Traffic Bureau v. Thompson, 232 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(dictum) (rule limiting practice of law to trained and qualified persons is founded on
principle of public benefit and protection, and should not be extended beyond the re-
quirements of the common good).
261. See Francisco v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 149 S.A.2d 619, 622 (rex. Civ. App.
1942) (dentist facing revocation of his professional license under a statute similar to the
one applicable to lawyers in Texas successfully argued that the court must inquire into
the circumstances of a felony conviction to ascertain whether a conviction could have been
obtained in Texas).
262. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 25 S.W. 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). The general hostility
in Texas to any "relaxation" of bar admission standards is well illustrated by
Cathey, The Fifth Amendment: Its Protection of the Right to Become and Remain a
Lawyer, 80 Tax. B. J. 765 (1967), in which the recent constitutional decisions of the United
States Supreme Court extending substantive due process rights to bar admission candidates
and disbarment defendants are strongly criticized.
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STATES WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS PRESCRIBING, OR ARGUABLY PRE-
SCRIBING, PER SE DISBARMENT UPON PROOF OF FELONY CONVICTION
ALABAMA: "An attorney must be removed for the following causes by
the Circuit Court: (1) upon his being convicted of a felony other than
manslaughter, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; in
either of which cases the record of his conviction is conclusive evi-
dence." ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 49 (1958).
GEORGIA: "An attorney must be removed by the superior court of the
county of his residence for the following causes: (1) upon his being
convicted of any crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
In either case the record of his conviction is conclusive evidence." GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-501 (1936).
IOWA: "The following are sufficient causes for revocation or suspen-
sion: (1) when he [the attorney] has been convicted of a felony, or of
a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude: in either of which cases
the record of conviction is conclusive evidence." IowA CODE ANN.§ 610.24 (1950).
NEW MEXICO: "In the case of the conviction of an attorney of a felony
or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the clerk.., must...
transmit to the Supreme Court ... the record . . . , and the Supreme
Court upon receipt of such record, after judgment of such conviction
is filed, must enter an order disbarring such attorney." N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 18-1-18 (1953).
NEW YORK: "Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who
shall be convicted of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be
an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law
as such.
Whenever any attorney and counsellor-at-law shall be convicted of a
felony, there may be presented to the appellate division of the supreme
court a certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of such convic-
tion, and thereupon the name of the person so convicted shall, by order
of the court, be struck from the roll of attorneys." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW§ 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
OKLAHOMA: "The court shall order [an attorney] . . . disbarred when
the time for appeal [of his felony conviction] . . . has elapsed . . . or
when the judgment of conviction has been affirmed on appeal." OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 1, art. 7, pt. 2, § 7 (1966).
TExAs: "No person convicted of a felony shall receive a license as an
attorney at law; or, if licensed, any court of record in which such per-
son may practice shall, on proof of a conviction of any felony, revokehis license and strike his name from the roll of attorneys." TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 311 (1959).
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SoUTH DAKOTA: "The following are sufficient causes for revocation or
suspension of an attorney and counselor's license: (1) conviction of a
felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in either of which
cases the record of conviction is conclusive evidence;..." S.D. Cox-
PLLE. LAws § 16-19-2 (1967).
UTAH: "Upon conviction of an attorney and counselor of felony...
the judgment of the Supreme Court must be that the name of the ac-
cused be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors of the
court, and that he be precluded from practicing as an attorney or
counselor in all the courts of the state." UTAi CODE ANN. § 78-51-37
(1953).
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